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INTRODUCTION
Assuming that society and the justice system possess an inherent
interest in truth,1 what social benefit justifies what would arguably be
the most intimate invasion of privacy possible?2 What is the role of
the jury, and what purpose does it serve within the larger confines of
our justice system?3 Is it possible to utilize lie detection technology
without displacing the jury’s role and purpose?4
What does it mean for evidence to be reliable? How reliable must
evidence be before we allow it to be considered by the jury? Would
that level of reliability be different if the evidence was only shown to
a judge? Does the requisite level of reliability differ for different
kinds of evidence?5 In determining reliability, why must a judge use
scientific norms to assess legal relevance?6 If lie detection becomes
sufficiently reliable under legal standards, will it be admissible in
court?
These are but a few of the questions that the advent of deception
detection using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) has
raised. This Note only purports to definitively answer the last of
these questions: whether lie detection, if it becomes sufficiently
reliable under legal standards, will be admissible in court, while
shedding light on at least some of the others. As an established
scholar in the field of neuroimaging recently pointed out, the
comparisons of this technology to the mind-reading lore of 1984,
Minority Report, and Inception are premature, generating debates
that are ‘‘too untethered from scientific reality.’’7 This technology,
1. Charles N.W. Keckler, Cross-Examining the Brain: A Legal Analysis of
Neural Imaging for Credibility Impeachment, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 509, 553---54 (2006).
Keckler assumes that ‘‘society possesses an interest in the truth, and that the AngloAmerican adversary system purports to serve this interest.’’ Id. But the admissibility
of fMRI deception detection technology must be contemplated in a vacuum because
the economic litigation approach, under which ‘‘litigation is preferred over settlement
only so long as the parties have different expectations of trial outcome,’’ may in fact
perpetuate confusion. Id.
2. See Brian Reese, Using fMRI as a Lie Detector------Are We Lying to
Ourselves?, 19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 205, 205 (2009).
3. See Julie A. Seaman, Black Boxes, 58 EMORY L. J. 427, 434 (2008).
4. See Aaron M. Stronge, Absolute Truth or Deus Ex Machina?: The Legal and
Philosophical Ramifications of Guilt-Assessment Technology, 10 J. HIGH TECH. L.
113 (2009).
5. See generally Frederick Schauer & Barbara A. Spellman, Is Expert Evidence
Really Different? 9 (Feb. 1, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2210397.
6. See id.
7. Francis X. Shen, Neuroscience, Mental Privacy, and the Law, 36 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 653, 655 (2013).
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however, is more likely than any others that have come before it to
reliably distinguish a person’s truthful statements from deceptive
ones.8
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the anatomy of a lie and
the technologies used to detect them. Part II discusses the relevant
evidentiary rules governing the admissibility of such technology, as
well as the evidentiary significance of these technologies under these
rules. Part III considers the admissibility of fMRI deception
detection technology once it becomes reliable enough to satisfy the
standards governing scientific expert testimony. Part IV concludes
the discussion, finding that this technology’s probative value will not
be outweighed by any potential for undue prejudice, or to confuse or
mislead the jury.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Lie Detection
Humans have sought the ability to distinguish the truth from a lie
from time immemorial. Lies take many different forms, and different
techniques and technologies have been developed to try to measure
these different lies. The most famous lie detection technology is the
polygraph, but new technology that measures the brain’s activity now
offers the greatest potential to be of use for the legal system.

1.

Executive Function

Evolution has endowed humans with several capabilities that
separate us from our animal kin. Of these, perhaps the most
important is the growth of a part of our brains called the prefrontal
cortex, which has grown at a faster rate in homo sapiens than in the
rest of the animal kingdom.9 The prefrontal cortex is the crux of what
separates humans from our evolutionary brethren,10 allowing us to
engage in a broad range of behaviors encapsulated by the term

8. Daniel D. Langleben & Jane Campbell Moriarty, Using Brain Imaging for Lie
Detection: Where Science, Law, and Policy Collide, 19 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L.
222, 223 (2013) (asserting that fMRI will be more successful in detecting lies than
electroencephalography and polygraph technology).
9. See Katerina Semendeferi et al., Prefrontal Cortex in Humans and Apes: A
Comparative Study of Area 10, 114 AM. J. PHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 224, 224
(2001).
10. See Kate Teffer & Katerina Semendeferi, Human Prefrontal Cortex:
Evolution, Development, and Pathology, in 195 PROGRESS IN BRAIN RESEARCH 191,
191 (Michael A. Hoffman & Dean Falk eds., 2012).

2013]

ADMISSIBILITY OF fMRI TECHNOLOGY

719

‘‘executive function.’’11 These behaviors include problem-solving,
modifications in behavioral responses to stimuli, planning, and
behavioral inhibition------allowing humans to conform to society’s
expectations.12
Although deception predates the evolution of
language,13 the evolutionary growth of the brain’s prefrontal cortex,
and consequential advent of language, led to an ‘‘efflorescence of
[deception] complexity.’’14 This executive function system works in
conjunction with other parts of the brain, such as those that deal with
instincts like breathing and sleeping.15 Crucially, for the purposes of
this Note, the executive function interacts with the parts of the brain
that deal with memory.16

2.

Anatomy of a Lie

Truth is not a binary concept------it lies on a wide spectrum.17 There
are theoretically three types of lies.18 First, when a subject, who
knows of some fact X, is asked if he knows of X, and he feigns

11. Sean A. Spence et al., A Cognitive Neurobiological Account of Deception:
Evidence from Functional Neuroimaging, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y. B
BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1755, 1755---56 (2004).
12. See Archie Alexander, Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Lie
Detection: Is A ‘‘Brainstorm’’ Heading Toward the ‘‘Gatekeeper’’?, 7 HOUS. J.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 9---10 (2006).
13. See Keckler, supra note 1, at 519 (citing Robin Dunbar, On the Origin of the
Human Mind, in EVOLUTION AND THE HUMAN MIND: MODULARITY, LANGUAGE,
AND META-COGNITION 238---53 (Peter Carruthers & Andrew Chamberlain eds.,
2000)).
14. Id. at 519 n.36 (‘‘‘In human evolution, processes of deception and selfdeception were greatly heightened by the advent of language. Language permits
individuals to make statements about events distant in time and space, and these are
least amenable to contradiction. Thus, language permits verbal deception of many
different kinds.’’’ (quoting ROBERT TRIVERS, SOCIAL EVOLUTION 416 (1985))).
15. See Semendeferi et al., supra note 9, at 193.
16. See Maria Jurado & Monica Rosselli, The Elusive Nature of Executive
Functions: A Review of our Current Understanding, 17 NEUROPSYCHOLOGY REV.
213, 215 (2007).
17. See Alexander, supra note 12, at 12---13 (describing the spectrum of conveying
information from intentional to unintentional distortions of truth, including
‘‘concealment, distortion, fabrication, or manipulation of truthful information’’); see
also Keckler, supra note 1, at 539 (citing Bella M. DePaolo et al., Cues to Deception,
129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 74, 105 (2003)) (referring to a meta-analysis of 1338 cues of
deception, which indicates a large psychological gray area between truth and deceit);
Jed S. Rakoff, Lie Detection in the Courts: The Vain Search for the Magic Bullet, in
USING IMAGING TO IDENTIFY DECEIT: SCIENTIFIC AND ETHICAL QUESTIONS 40, 44
(2009) (‘‘The law recognizes many kinds of lies, ranging from ‘white lies’ and ‘puffing’
to affirmative misstatements, actionable half-truths, and material omissions.’’).
18. These categories are the author’s own variation of several mentioned
throughout the literature. See, e.g., Keckler, supra note 1, at 510.
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ignorance of this fact, that is called ‘‘guilty knowledge.’’19 The second
category is when a subject makes a genuine assertion of truth that is
not objectively true------these assertions are sometimes ‘‘mistakes’’ or
‘‘delusions.’’20 The third, and possibly most important, category is
when a subject knows of some fact X, yet when asked if he has any
knowledge of X, he instead responds with some falsehood Y.21 The
key difference between the latter two categories is the intent of the
subject to deceive in the third category, as compared with the honest
assertion of subjective truth in the second.22 In this third category, the
subject must suppress truth X from his memory, while simultaneously
constructing falsehood Y. 23

3.

Deception Detection Techniques

The first of two techniques commonly used to detect deception is
the Control Question Test (CQT).24 This test theoretically allows an
examiner to detect deception by comparing a subject’s physical
responses to different types of questions.25 An examiner usually asks
an innocuous ‘‘control question,’’ such as the subject’s name, to get a
baseline reading of the subject’s physical response while being honest
and truthful.26 Then the examiner asks pointed and relevant
questions, which have to do with the topic of the test.27 Deception is
inferred when physical reactions are stronger or different in the
‘‘relevant’’ condition than in the ‘‘control’’ condition.28
Another commonly used method to detect deception is the Guilty
Knowledge Test (GKT),29 which is also referred to as the Concealed
Information Test (CIT).30 This test can theoretically determine if a
subject has intimate knowledge about the details of a question, such

19. See id.
20. Eric K. Gerard, Waiting in the Wings? The Admissibility of Neuroimagery for
Lie Detection, 27 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 1, 7 (2008).
21. See Keckler, supra note 1, at 510.
22. See Gerard, supra note 20.
23. Michael S. Pardo, Neuroscience Evidence, Legal Culture, and Criminal
Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 301, 312---13 (2006).
24. See John B. Meixner, Liar, Liar, Jury’s the Trier? The Future of
Neuroscience-Based Credibility Assessment in the Court, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1451,
1455 (2012).
25. See id.
26. See id. at 1455---56.
27. See id. at 1455.
28. See id. at 1456.
29. See id. at 1458 n.42.
30. See id.
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as the specific details of a crime or weapon used.31 Similar to the
CQT, an examiner uses the GKT to derive his conclusions from the
elevated physical response that a subject theoretically shows when
asked about, or shown, details of a crime.32 The GKT’s distinguishing
factor is that it does not attempt to discern if a person is lying per se;
rather, it is only used to discern whether a person has relevant
knowledge of details of a crime that, most likely, only the perpetrator
would know.33 If the subject has denied knowledge of these details,
yet the test shows physical arousal, the examiner may infer
deception.34
B.

Lie Detection Technology

The polygraph changed the landscape of lie detection in the
modern age, but newer technologies that measure activity in the brain
have the potential to alter this landscape even more significantly.35

1.

Polygraph

Polygraph technology measures a subject’s physiological reactions
to questions given by an examiner.36 Corrugated rubber tubes or
electronic sensors measure respiratory activity,37 cardiographs
measure heart rates,38 and galvanic skin electrodes measure
perspiration.39 The premise of the polygraph test is that a subject will
exhibit a different physiological reaction when lying than when telling
the truth.40
Several problems plague both the technology and its use. First, the
examiner’s behavior can have a strong influence on the subject and

31. See id at 1458.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 1459.
34. See id. at 1458 (providing that in such circumstances knowledge of the crime
may be inferred).
35. See Leo Kittay, Admissibility of fMRI Lie Detection: The Cultural Bias
Against ‘‘Mind Reading’’ Devices, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 1351, 1360---61 (2007).
36. See
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
AM.
POLYGRAPH
ASS’N,
http://www.polygraph.org/section/resources/frequently-asked-questions (last visited
Nov. 22, 2013).
37. Id.
38. Gerard, supra note 20, at 20 (citing Steven I. Friedland, Law, Science, and
Malingering, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 337, 357 (1998)).
39. Id.
40. See id.
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his responses.41 Second, the examiner must subjectively interpret the
results to conclude that the subject was being deceptive, allowing for
elements of human error.42 Third, the physiological reactions that this
technology measures are not unique to deception;43 instead of
detecting deception, the technology could be reading reactions caused
by anxiety from the test or its possible consequences.44 Fourth,
polygraph tests are notoriously vulnerable to countermeasures that
allow subjects to avoid deception detection.45 Finally, reported
accuracy rates have a very large range, anywhere from the ‘‘toss of a
coin’’46 to ninety percent in controlled settings.47

2.

Brain Imaging

Examiners have utilized technology that measures brain activity to
measure lie detection. Older and less precise technologies have given
way in scientific and legal realms to the fMRI.

a.

Lesser Used Technologies

Several functional neuroimaging techniques predate the fMRI
technique that is the focus of this Note.
Positron Emission
Tomography (PET) and Single Photon Emission Computed

41. See Spencer J. Brooks, Scanning the Horizon: The Past, Present, and Future
of Neuroimaging for Lie Detection in Court, 51 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 353, 360
(2013) (asserting that the expectations of the test-giver can influence both his
interpretation and the subject’s responses); see also Gerard, supra note 20, at 21
(asserting that an examiner’s tone of voice, posture, comportment, intonation, and
other verbal and non-verbal cues may all affect subject responses); Kittay, supra note
35, at 1362.
42. See Gerard, supra note 20, at 21 (‘‘[E]xaminers may differ in the numerical
values they assign for a set of answers and their attendant physiological responses.’’).
43. Brooks, supra note 41, at 359.
44. Gerard, supra note 20, at 21.
45. Kittay, supra note 35, at 1364 (‘‘Subjects have used counter-measures, such as
sedatives, to dampen their autonomic responses and stressors, such as flexing muscle
or placing tacks in a shoe, to artificially inflate or create stress reactions.’’); see also
Alexander, supra note 12, at 31 (stating that subjects may engage in ‘‘the self
infliction of pain[] to create a false physiological response to the control questions.’’);
Brooks, supra note 41, at 359; Gerard, supra note 20, at 21.
46. United States v. Cordoba, 991 F. Supp. 1199, 1203 (C.D. Cal. 1998), aff’d, 194
F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting W. Iacono & D. Lykken, The Scientific Status of
Research on Polygraph Techniques: The Case Against Polygraph Tests, in 1
MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 14-3 (D. Faigman et al. eds., 1997)).
47. Kittay, supra note 35, at 1363 (citing 4 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE §§
40:25---28 (D. Faigman et al. eds., 2005---06)). The American Polygraph Association
claims accuracy in the range of eighty-five to eighty-nine percent. Polygraph Validity
Research, AM. POLYGRAPH ASS’N, www.polygraph.org/section/resources/polygraphvalidity-research (last visited Nov. 22, 2013).
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Tomography (SPECT) both detect the emission of gamma rays
emitted from a radioactive tracer that is injected into a subject’s
bloodstream.48 Both of these methods share common methodologies
with fMRI as to how the resulting image is constructed from the raw
data.49
Electroencephalography (EEG) measures the brain’s electrical
activity via electrodes placed on a scalp.50 Some scientists claim to be
able to utilize EEG to detect experiential knowledge (or ‘‘guilty
knowledge’’) of a an event or stimulus, called ‘‘brain fingerprinting.’’51
Scientists measure electrical currents after giving the subject a
stimulus,52 which is composed of some ‘‘relevant knowledge of the
salient features or events associated with a crime.’’53 These scientists
claim that, after being shown relevant knowledge related to the crime,
subjects with ‘‘guilty knowledge’’ in their memory emit an electrical
response 300 milliseconds later------dubbed the ‘‘P300 wave.’’54

b.

Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI)

Scholars have touted fMRI as the most promising technology for
purposes of legal lie detection55 because of its increased availability,
reduction in cost,56 and optimal balance in resolution.57 This
technique utilizes the ‘‘technology of regular magnetic resonance
48. Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through a Scanner Darkly: Functional
Neuroimaging as Evidence of a Criminal Defendant’s Past Mental States, 62 STAN. L.
REV. 1119, 1136 (2010).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Alexander, supra note 12, at 35---40.
52. Henry T. Greely & Judy Illes, Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection: The Urgent
Need for Regulation, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 377, 387 (2007).
53. Alexander, supra note 12, at 36.
54. See id. For a discussion of cases that have discussed the admissibility of this
technology, see id. at 36---40.
55. There is a great deal of publication on the science behind fMRI technology,
with varying degrees of detail. For in-depth discussion on fMRI, its various
measurements, and the resulting inferences that can be made, see Brown & Murphy,
supra note 48, at 1138---55. For detailed discussion on the physics and minutiae of
fMRI, see Alexander, supra note 12, at 15---24 (explaining fMRI technology from the
atomic level upward). For in-depth explanation of broader neuroscience concepts
and technologies, see generally HENRY T. GREELY & ANTHONY D. WAGNER,
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: REFERENCE GUIDE ON
NEUROSCIENCE (3d ed. 2011). For further background, see Mark Pettit, Jr., fMRI
and BF Meet FRE: Brain Imaging and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 33 AM. J.L. &
MED. 319, 340 (2007); Reese, supra note 2, at 227.
56. See Brown & Murphy, supra note 48, at 1138.
57. See ORRIN DEVINSKY & MARK D’ESPOSITO, NEUROLOGY OF COGNITIVE AND
BEHAVIORAL DISORDERS 57 (2004).
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imaging adapted to detect changes in hemodynamic (literally ‘blood
movement’) properties of the brain occurring when the subject is
engaged in very specific mental tasks.’’58 fMRI is an upgrade over
other types of neuroimaging technologies because it is quick, safe,
and non-invasive.59 fMRI creates a primary magnetic field and one in
each three-dimensional plane within the confines of the machine.60
While in the apparatus, the atoms in the subject’s brain align in
accordance with this magnetic field.61 The subject then engages in
mental tasks while the machine measures magnetic activity in threedimensional, cubic volumes of brain tissue called ‘‘voxels.’’62 The
machine records this activity in many different dimensions, or
‘‘slices,’’ of the brain for its spatial resolution, as well as over the span
of several seconds for temporal resolution.63 Scholars believe that
fMRI has the best balance in the necessary trade-offs between spatial
and temporal resolution.64
fMRI technology indirectly monitors brain activity through the
measurement of differences in the magnetic properties of blood over
time, called Blood Oxygen Level Dependent (BOLD) response.65 It
is important to emphasize that fMRI does not directly measure the
movement or firing of neurons.66 All mental activity, however, does
require neuronal firing------the more complex the mental task, the more
neurons are recruited to fire, as well as more often.67 Since the brain
does not contain reserves for energy, neuronal access to oxygen must
constantly be refreshed.68 The oxygenated blood carrying energy to

58. Owen D. Jones et al., Brain Imaging for Legal Thinkers: A Guide for the
Perplexed, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5, 16.
59. Brown & Murphy, supra note 48, at 1138. For example, even though EEG is
less expensive and more mobile, fMRI is vastly superior in its ability to localize the
sources of signals in the brain. Langleben & Moriarty, supra note 8. For a discussion
of the actual experience of an fMRI scan, see Brown & Murphy, supra note 48, at
1139.
60. See Jones et al., supra note 58, at 18.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 17.
63. See id.; see also Greely & Illes, supra note 52, at 381---82 (discussing the
differences and trade-offs between spatial and temporal resolution).
64. DEVINSKY & D’ESPOSITO, supra note 57, at 57.
65. See Brown & Murphy, supra note 48, at 1138. For further discussion of what
is known and the uncertainties of BOLD, see id. at 1139---42. For a discussion of
variability in blood flow, see Greely & Illes, supra note 52, at 380---81.
66. See Brown & Murphy, supra note 48, at 1138; see also Greely & Illes, supra
note 52, at 380.
67. See Brown & Murphy, supra note 48, at 1138.
68. Id. The brain derives energy through the oxidation of glucose to create
adenosine triphosphate (ATP). Greely & Illes, supra note 52, at 380.
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these neurons is magnetically discernible from deoxygenated blood
particles that have already delivered oxygen to neurons.69 fMRI scan
images depict the BOLD responses over time and through space------it
is not a picture or snapshot of the brain at any given time.70
fMRI imaging helps researchers determine which parts of the brain
are involved in performing cognitive tasks by utilizing the theory of
cognitive subtraction.71 ‘‘Part of the art of fMRI imaging is designing
an experimental task that is simple and specific so that behavioral
responses can be attributed to an isolated mental process and not
confounded by other functions . . . .’’72 Researchers employ the
difference between the control and experimental tasks’ BOLD
responses in making deductions about which pathways were used to
accomplish the tasks in each condition.73
Researchers have applied fMRI technology and the cognitive
subtraction theory in an attempt to locate the neural mechanisms
recruited for deception, with some studies confirming either the
possibility of, or actual, experimental success in distinguishing lies
from truth telling.74 There is currently no overwhelming consensus on

69. Brown & Murphy, supra note 48, at 1138.
70. Adina L. Roskies, Are Neuroimages Like Photographs of the Brain?, 74 PHIL.
SCI. 860---72 (2007).
71. Greely & Illes, supra note 52, at 383; Sean A. Spence, Playing Devil’s
Advocate: The Case Against fMRI Lie Detection, 13 L. & CRIMINOLOGICAL
PSYCHOL. 11, 12---13 (2008) (explaining the role of cognitive subtraction in fMRI
research).
72. Greely & Illes, supra note 52, at 383.
73. Id.
74. Frederick Schauer, Can Bad Science Be Good Evidence? Neuroscience, Lie
Detection, and Beyond, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1191, 1197 n.31 (2010) (compiling the
sources of many studies researching fMRI detection of deception); see, e.g., Christos
Davatzikos et al., Classifying Spatial Patterns of Brain Activity with Machine
Learning Methods: Application to Lie Detection, 28 NEUROIMAGE 663, 668 (2005)
(concluding that a nonlinear pattern classification method can detect patterns of
brain activity associated with lying); G. Ganis et al., Neural Correlates of Different
Types of Deception: An fMRI Investigation, 13 CEREBRAL CORTEX 830, 832---38
(2003) (yielding results that ‘‘show that different patterns of brain activation arise
when people tell lies than when they tell the truth’’); Joshua D. Greene & Joseph M.
Paxton, Patterns of Neural Activity Associated with Honest and Dishonest Moral
Decisions, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 12506, 12509---10 (2009) (suggesting that
individual differences in brain ‘‘control network activity’’ are associated with
differences in presence of dishonest behavior); F. Andrew Kozel et al., Brief
Communication: A Replication Study of the Neural Correlates of Deception, 118
BEHAV. NEUROSCIENCE 852, 855 (2004) (finding that ‘‘[f]or lying, compared with
telling the truth, there is more activation in the right anterior cingulate, right inferior
frontal, right orbitofrontal, right middle frontal, and left middle temporal areas’’); F.
Andrew Kozel et al., Detecting Deception Using Functional Magnetic Resonance
Imaging, 58 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 605, 611 (2005) [hereinafter Kozel et al.,
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which neural regions are consistently recruited for deception.75
Nevertheless, that may be because different experiments engender
the assertion of different kinds of lies. These different types of lies, in
turn, would engage different types of cognitive processes and

Detecting Deception] (concluding that ‘‘fMRI can be used to detect deception within
a cooperative individual’’); F. Andrew Kozel et al., A Pilot Study of Functional
Magnetic Resonance Imaging Brain Correlates of Deception in Healthy Young Men,
16 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 295, 304 (2004) [hereinafter
Kozel et al., Pilot Study] (concluding that using blood oxygen level dependent fMRI
‘‘to investigate brain changes associated with deception is . . . possible’’); Daniel D.
Langleben et al., Telling Truth from Lie in Individual Subjects with Fast EventRelated fMRI, 26 HUM. BRAIN MAPPING 262, 271 (2005) [hereinafter Langleben et
al., Telling Truth] (concluding that fMRI images may be able to distinguish a truth
from a lie on the basis that a lie ‘‘appears to be a more working memory-intensive
activity, characterized by increased activation of the inferolateral cortex implicated in
response selection, inhibition, and generation’’); Daniel D. Langleben et al., Rapid
Communication, Brain Activity During Simulated Deception: An Event-Related
Functional Magnetic Resonance Study, 15 NEUROIMAGE 727, 731 (2002) (finding a
‘‘neurophysiological difference between deception and truth’’); Tatia M.C. Lee et al.,
Neural Correlates of Feigned Memory Impairment, 28 NEUROIMAGE 305, 310---12
(2005); Tatia M.C. Lee et al., Lie Detection by Functional Magnetic Resonance
Imaging, 15 HUM. BRAIN MAPPING 157, 163 (2002) (concluding that it is ‘‘unfeasible’’
to control one’s cerebral activity to avoid lie detection); Donald H. Marks et al.,

Determination of Truth From Deception Using Functional MRI and Cognitive
Engrams, 5 INTERNET J. RADIOLOGY 1 (2006), available at http://ispub.com/
IJRA/5/1/9241 (showing that ‘‘specific activation patterns occur in the brain of
individuals looking at specific pictures, and also whether they are contemplating
giving a truthful or a deceptive response’’); Feroze B. Mohamed et al., Brain

Mapping of Deception and Truth Telling about an Ecologically Valid Situation:
Functional MR Imaging and Polygraph Investigation------Initial Experience, 238
RADIOLOGY 679, 679 (2006) (concluding that ‘‘specific areas of the brain involved in
deception or truth telling can be depicted with functional MR imaging’’); Jennifer
Maria Nuñez et al., Intentional False Responding Shares Neural Substrates with
Response Conflict and Cognitive Control, 25 NEUROIMAGE 267, 273---76 (2005)
(finding certain brain regions to be ‘‘significantly more active when falsifying
information as compared to when answering truthfully’’); Sean A. Spence et al.,

Speaking of Secrets and Lies: The Contribution of Ventrolateral Prefrontal Cortex to
Vocal Deception, 40 NEUROIMAGE 1411, 1415---18 (2008) [hereinafter Spence et al.,
Speaking of Secrets]; Sean A. Spence et al., Behavioural and Functional Anatomical
Correlates of Deception in Humans, 12 NEUROREPORT 2849, 2851---52 (2001) (finding
that individuals telling lies have increased response times and increased activation in
specific regions of the brain).
75. Compare Langleben et al., Telling Truth, supra note 74, at 271 (asserting that
the inferolateral cortex, which is responsible for response selection, inhibition, and
generation, is largely implicated in deception), with Jonathan G. Hakun et al.,
Towards Clinical Trials of Lie Detection with fMRI, 4 SOC. NEUROSCIENCE 518
(2009) (hypothesizing that the prefrontal-parietal system, which is responsible for
behavioral control and attention, is the locus of deception). Although there is no
overwhelming consensus, the regions that have resulted in the most consistent
activation are the prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, and parietal cortex. See
Martha J. Farah et al., Functional MRI-Based Lie Detection: Scientific and Societal
Challenges, 15 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 123, 123 (2014).
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different parts of the brain.76 Subjects are first scanned during a
baseline task of telling the truth.77 Next, the subjects are scanned
while engaged in an experiment that leads them to lie. Finally, the
areas engaged in the former condition are subtracted from those in
the latter, theoretically leaving researchers with the areas unique to
deception.78
Several unifying themes exist among the available scientific
research. First, some form of ‘‘executive’’ function is implicated in
choosing to respond with truth or deception,79 most often within the
brain’s prefrontal cortex.80 Second, deception usually recruits an area
within the brain correlated with memory.81 Third, deception usually
requires more brain activity and more time.82 Finally, this technology
can only test a subject’s subjective belief in the truth or falsity of his
statements83: indeed, fMRI imaging currently cannot discern honest
yet mistaken beliefs,84 or delusions.85
As with any nascent science, fMRI imaging is generally improving.
The hardware itself, as well as the algorithms and software that utilize
the resulting raw data, are improving the technology’s accuracy and
reliability.86 Ultimately, fMRI’s ability to accurately measure and
76. Pardo, supra note 23, at 313 (2006) (citing Giorgio Ganis et al., Neural
Correlates of Different Types of Deception: An fMRI Investigation, 13 CEREBRAL
CORTEX 830, 831 (2003)) (‘‘For example, spontaneous isolated lies may require
different cognitive processes than memorized lies forming a coherent scenario.’’).
77. Brown & Murphy, supra note 48, at 1136 n.63 (2010).
78. Spence, supra note 71, at 12---13 (explaining the role of cognitive subtraction in
fMRI research).
79. Alexander, supra note 12, at 11---12 (2006) (compiling the results of all known
fMRI deception detection experiments through 2006); Keckler, supra note 1, at 535
(analyzing the results of several major, widely-cited fMRI lie detection studies
through 2005).
80. Spence, supra note 71, at 22.
81. Keckler, supra note 1, at 535, 539---40 (asserting that one must hold the truth in
working memory while constructing a lie in order to be able to compare the two for a
response).
82. Spence, supra note 71, at 22.
83. Frederick Schauer, Lie-Detection, Neuroscience, and the Law of Evidence 17
n.36 (Oct. 22, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2165391.
84. Seaman, supra note 3, at 475 (citing Helen Pearson, Lure of Lie Detectors
Spooks Ethicists, 441 NATURE 918, 919 (2006)) (‘‘[D]ata collected from healthy
subjects reveal little about the mindset of someone who genuinely believes they are
telling the truth or someone who is confused, delusional or a pathological liar.’’).
85. Id. (citing Sean Spence et al., ‘Munchausen’s Syndrome by Proxy’ or a

‘Miscarriage of Justice’? An Initial Application of Functional Neuroimaging to the
Question of Guilt Versus Innocence, 23 EUR. PSYCHOL. 309, 311---13 (2008)).
86. See generally Julie Elizabeth Myers, The Moment of Truth for fMRI: Will
Deception Detection Pass Admissibility Hurdles in Oklahoma?, 6 OKLA. J. L. &

728

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLI

localize cognitive activity has created the expectation that it will be, if
it is not already, the most successful lie detection technology yet. 87
fMRI already enjoys several distinct technological advantages over
the polygraph.
Most importantly, fMRI is a first-order
88
measurement, directly measuring the central correlate of the
nervous system. In other words, fMRI measures the brain activity at
its source, which gives rise to the galvanic skin response, heart rate,
blood pressure, respiration changes that the polygraph measures.89
Secondly, and as a corollary to the previous point, fMRI is
theoretically less susceptible to countermeasures,90 as well as
confounding influences.91 One scholar analogizes a subject’s complex
neurological pattern of deception to a fingerprint: confounding
influences, such as stress or anxiety, would create distinct patterns
that are distinguishable from a pattern produced by deception, and
thus would be less likely to produce false positives.92 Third, fMRI’s
increased computerization93 allows for more accurate and objective
results.94 Fourth, fMRI obtains data that cannot be acquired through

TECH. 47 (2010); see also, J.R.H. Law, Cherry-Picking Memories: Why

Neuroimaging-Based Lie Detection Requires a New Framework for the
Admissibility of Scientific Evidence Under FRE 702 and Daubert, 14 YALE J. L. &
TECH. 1, 39 (2011) (‘‘Some of the newest techniques for controlling false positives
have only been developed in the last few years.’’).
87. Langleben & Moriarty, supra note 8, at 223 (asserting that fMRI will be more
successful in detecting lies than EEG and polygraph technology).
88. Seaman, supra note 3, at 446.
89. Langleben & Moriarty, supra note 8, at 223.
90. Gerard, supra note 20, at 26 (2008) (‘‘Control over blood flow within one’s
brain is more difficult to accomplish that control over physiological responses such as
one’s heart or respiratory rate.’’). But see Giorgio Ganis et al., Lying in the Scanner:

Covert Countermeasures Disrupt Deception Detection by Functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging, 55 NEUROIMAGE 312, 317---18 (2011) (asserting that subjects can
be trained to avoid deception detection). Indeed, one scholar points out that due to
the sensitivity of fMRI measurement, most small movements such as moving one’s
head, fingers or tongue, or even doing mental arithmetic, could confound an
experiment’s results. See Nancy Kanwisher, The Use of fMRI in Lie Detection: What
Has Been Shown and What Has Not, in USING IMAGING TO IDENTIFY DECEIT:
SCIENTIFIC AND ETHICAL QUESTIONS, supra note 17, at 7, 12.
91. Keckler, supra note 1, at 540 (stating the anxiety would create another distinct
brain activity pattern, not create a pattern that would be confused with deception).
92. Id.
93. Neal Feigenson, Brain Imaging and Courtroom Evidence: On the
Admissibility and Persuasiveness of fMRI, 2 INT’L J. L. CONTEXT 247 (2006)
(discussing the objective and ‘‘mathematised’’ nature of fMRI data); Gerard, supra
note 20, at 26 (2008).
94. Kittay, supra note 35, at 1365 (2007); Myers, supra note 86, at 13 (asserting
that the computerization aspect puts fMRI in a different class of evidence than
polygraphs, fingerprinting, and even Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) sequencing).
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normal social interaction,95 and its results do not require subjective
interpretation.96
As it currently stands, a majority of both legal97 and scientific98
articles contend that fMRI technology is in need of much
improvement before its legal admissibility should be seriously
considered.99 The application of this technology for lie detection
purposes is also fraught with constitutional issues that must be
addressed before its widespread adoption for criminal prosecution.100
Besides technical improvements, fMRI must increase its
reproducibility and reliability at several different levels: imaging must
be conducted when the stakes are higher, on more diverse subjects,
with testing on the individual level, and with subjects employing

95. Kittay, supra note 35, at 1389 (2007) (‘‘No matter how closely a jury pays
attention, it would not be able to determine which brain region the defendant used to
answer a question.’’).
96. Brown & Murphy, supra note 48, at 1189. However, fMRI does require
scientists to set thresholds in the acquisition of results, which some analogize to
interpretation. Id.
97. See, e.g., Charles Adelsheim, Functional Magnetic Resonance Detection of
Deception: Great as Fundamental Research, Inadequate as Substantive Evidence, 62
MERCER L. REV. 885 (2011); Brown & Murphy, supra note 48, at 1189; Law, supra
note 86, at 1.
98. See Schauer, supra note 74, at 1200 n.46 (citing articles from authors in
various scientific disciplines that ‘‘insist[] that fMRI is not ready for the ‘real world’’’);
see also, e.g., Michael S. Gazzaniga, The Law and Neuroscience, 60 NEURON 412---13
(2008) (cautioning against the introduction of neuroscience-based lie detection
evidence because jurors and judges may erroneously accept such evidence as legally
dispositive); James R. Merikangas, Commentary: Functional MRI Lie Detection, 36
J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 499, 501 (2008) (concluding that fMRI lie detection
technology does not meet the Daubert criteria for courtroom testimony); Rakoff,
supra note 17, at 40, 44 (arguing that neuroscience-based lie detection ‘‘suffers from
several defects that would render such evidence inadmissible under [Federal Rule of
Evidence] 702’’); Joseph R. Simpson, Functional MRI Lie Detection: Too Good to
Be True?, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 491, 493 (2008) (‘‘[H]ow well fMRI lie
detection would work in real-life situations remains an open question.’’); Spence,
supra note 71, at 11 (suggesting that fMRI-based lie detection is inapplicable to the
‘‘real world’’ and lacks scientific reliability because no fMRI-based lie detection study
has been replicated).
99. See infra note 151. This Note proceeds under the strong assumption that the
necessary improvements will be made to satisfy the requirements of scientific
evidence under the FRE. This assumption is necessary for my analysis under FRE
403. Without these technological improvements, fMRI technology will likely fail to
be admitted under FRE 702, obviating an FRE 403 analysis.
100. See Mara Boundy, The Government Can Read Your Mind: Can the
Constitution Stop It?, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1627, 1643 (2012); Pardo, supra note 23, at
302. For a complete, in-depth survey of this field and a compilation of scholars’
assertions regarding the interplay between this technology and the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments, see Shen, supra note 7, at 692---707.
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various countermeasures.101 None of these problems, however, seem
to pose a fatal threat to its legal application; the technology simply
needs more time and funding to strengthen its clinical foundation.102
II. RELEVANT EVIDENTIARY RULES
As with all evidence, this technology will be subject to the Federal
Rules of Evidence (FRE) before it may be properly admitted in
courts. This Note focuses on the effects of this technology within the
guilt phase of a criminal jury trial, although it is applicable to other
settings as well.103 Generally, evidence must be both relevant and
authenticated before more specific rules are applied to assess its
admissibility.104 FRE 702 deals broadly with scientific evidence, while
FRE 403 requires balancing the value of evidence with issues the
evidence presents. The relevant evidence rules, as well as the current
evidentiary significance of both polygraph and brain imaging
technologies, are discussed in the following sections.
A. Rules

1.

Authentication

fMRI images are likely to be introduced as circumstantial,
demonstrative evidence relevant to a person’s credibility that must be
accompanied by expert testimony.105 ‘‘fMRI provides the basis of the
expert’s opinion by applying neuropsychological models, laws of
physics, and statistical principles in order to draw probabilistic
conclusions about an individual’s brain activity.’’106
To be
authenticated, the technology must show that the general
methodology produces an accurate result, and that the examiner

101. See infra Part III.A.3 for a discussion of reliability and validity of results; see
also, Adelsheim, supra note 97, at 892---905; Langleben & Moriarty, supra note 8, at
229---30.
102. Langleben & Moriarty, supra note 8, at 230.
103. See generally Feigenson, supra note 93; Owen D. Jones & Francis X. Shen,
Law and Neuroscience in the United States, in INTERNATIONAL NEUROLAW: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 349 (Tade M. Spranger ed., 2012).
104. Brown & Murphy, supra note 48, at 1155.
105. Brown & Murphy, supra note 48, at 1156---58. One day, fMRI images may be
considered testimonial, such as the aforementioned ‘guilty knowledge.’ Id. at 1156.
This would implicate the hearsay doctrine and protections against self-incrimination.
Id. at 1156---57. For a discussion on the Constitutional implications of fMRI
technology, see generally Shen, supra note 7.
106. Brown & Murphy, supra note 48, at 1171.
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followed the proper methodology in any particular case.107 Although
there is no ‘‘one-size-fits-all’’ authentication process, admissibility
procedures for fMRI will likely follow that of photographs, x-rays,
and/or computer-generated simulations.108 Given more sophistication
and obscure methods, each generation of imaging devices requires a
higher degree of authentication initially before eventually becoming
admitted on a more regular basis.109

2.

Rule 702

FRE 702, which pertains to scientific expert testimony,110 will likely
be the largest hurdle fMRI deception detection must pass before
being admitted in the guilt phase of criminal jury trials.111 This Rule
was adopted as improvement over the former Frye standard, which
admitted scientific evidence if it could be ‘‘sufficiently established to
have gained general acceptance in the particular field.’’112 FRE 702
states that an expert witness may testify: (1) if his knowledge helps
the trier of fact understand evidence; (2) if his knowledge is based on
sufficient facts or data; (3) if his testimony is the result of reliable
principles and methods; and (4) if he has reliably applied the
principles and methods to the facts of the case.113
FRE 702 was amended in the wake of the landmark Daubert
case,114 which sanctioned trial judges as gatekeepers, empowering
them with the responsibility to assess the scientific validity of
evidence before its admission.115 Under Daubert, factors to be
considered in deciding whether the methodology underlying
proffered evidence is reliable or scientifically valid for the purposes of
FRE 702 include: (1) the falsifiability of hypotheses and whether the
technique used in gathering the evidence has been tested; (2) whether
the technique has been subject to peer review; (3) whether there are
known or potential error rates and whether there are standards

107. Id. at 1164.
108. Id. at 1169---70.
109. Id.
110. See FED. R. EVID. 702.
111. For a discussion of the current technology’s admissibility under FED. R. EVID.
702, see infra Part III.A.
112. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (emphasis added).
Fourteen states still employ this standard. Brown & Murphy, supra note 48, at 1176.
113. FED. R. EVID. 702.
114. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (amended in 2000) (noting that
the rule was ‘‘amended in response to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
509 U.S. 579 (1993), and to the many cases applying Daubert’’).
115. See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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controlling the technique’s operation; and (4) whether the technique
has garnered general acceptance in the relevant scientific
community.116 Although the Daubert Court did not intend for the
factors explicated in its holding to constitute a check-list,117 they have
since been treated as dispositive factors in determining the
admissibility of expert testimony.118 In applying this standard in later
cases, the Court further held that expert witnesses cannot
unjustifiably extrapolate from an accepted premise to an unfounded
conclusion: the data on which an expert relies must fit the facts of the
case. 119
Importantly, this Note initially proceeds under the assumption that
the application of fMRI technology for deception detection purposes
will develop its reliability enough to the point of satisfying FRE 702
and its accompanying case law, in order to discuss the potential
impact of another FRE that has the ability to bar this technology-----FRE 403.

3.

Rule 403

The second, more general, rule of evidence that may serve to
exclude fMRI deception detection is FRE 403, which states that a
‘‘court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following:
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue
delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.’’120
This Rule is generally viewed as a low bar for admission,121 applied by
courts ‘‘only sparingly since the evidence excluded is concededly
probative.’’122 This application requires a court to balance the

116. Id. at 593---95.
117. Id. at 593 (‘‘Many factors will bear on the inquiry, and we do not presume to
set out a definitive checklist or test.’’).
118. D. Michael Risinger, Goodbye to All That, or A Fool’s Errand, by One of the

Fools: How I Stopped Worrying About Court Responses to Handwriting
Identification (and ‘‘Forensic Science’’ in General) and Learned to Love
Misinterpretations of Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 43 TULSA L. REV. 447, 460 (2007).
119. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (noting that judges ‘‘may
conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the
opinion proffered’’).
120. FED. R. EVID. 403 (emphasis added); see United States v. Semrau, No. 0710074 Ml/P., 2010 WL 6845092 (W.D. Tenn. June 1, 2010).
121. See 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 403.02 (Joseph M. McLaughin & Matthew Bender eds., 2d ed. 1997)
(updated LexisNexis 2013).
122. Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 453 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Blancha v. Raymark
Indus., 972 F.2d 507, 516 (3d Cir. 1992)); see also John C. Bush, Warping the Rules:
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evidence’s probative value with its various potential negative
consequences.123 Further, the unfair prejudice that the proffered
evidence must engender must not only outweigh its ‘‘concededly
probative’’ value, but it must also do so substantially.124 It is
important to note that, in our adversarial system of justice, attorneys
purposely attempt to create prejudice to convince a neutral party of
the strength of one’s case through proffered evidence.125 Thus, judges
should not use this rule of evidence merely to level the playing field of
the ‘‘relative strengths and weaknesses of cases.’’126
B.

Technology’s Evidentiary Significance

1.

The Polygraph

fMRI technology’s prospects for successful admission have most
often been discussed in light of the polygraph’s admissibility failure,127
which has even been dubbed the ‘‘pyrite standard’’ of unscientific
means to ascertain the truth.128 The admissibility of polygraph
technology has been extensively researched and written about.129 Its
admissibility was most notably and recently decided upon in United
States v. Scheffer.130 The plaintiff in that case, Edward Scheffer,
challenged the military’s ban on the use of polygraph technology in
court-martial proceedings as a violation of his Sixth Amendment right
to present a defense.131 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces reversed the court-martial conviction.132 The Supreme
Court reversed the decision, upholding a per se ban on polygraph
technology in military court-martial proceedings, stating that the

How Some Courts Misapply Generic Evidentiary Rules to Exclude Polygraph
Evidence, 59 VAND. L. REV. 539, 559 (2006).
123. See Fred Galves, Where the Not-So-Wild Things Are: Computers in the
Courtroom, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the Need for Institutional Reform
and More Judicial Acceptance, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 161, 270 (2000).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 222.
126. Id. at 270.
127. See, e.g., Kittay, supra note 35.
128. Keckler, supra note 1, at 511.
129. See, e.g., Bush, supra note 122; Christopher Domin, Mitigating Evidence? The
Admissibility of Polygraph Results in the Penalty Phase of a Capital Trial, 43 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1461 (2010).
130. 523 U.S. 303 (1998).
131. Id.
132. United States v. Scheffer, 44 M.J. 442 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
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government had a ‘‘legitimate interest in ensuring that reliable
evidence is presented to the trier of fact in a criminal trial.’’133
The Court mainly cited the lack of consensus on polygraph’s
reliability as a basis for the legitimate interest in the ban.134 Almost
all courts have precluded the admission of polygraph evidence, but
there are some jurisdictions that permit its inclusion under certain
circumstances.135 Polygraph technology also has uses outside of the
courtroom, such as in negotiation, prosecutorial discretion, and plea
agreements.136

2.

Brain Imaging137

fMRI deception detection techniques have not yet been admitted
in the criminal context. It is widely believed that the first case to
admit fMRI evidence whatsoever was in the sentencing phase of a
capital punishment case; however, the judge only permitted the fMRI
neuroscientist to describe the results of his tests, for fear that showing
the fMRI images would over-influence the jury.138 If these techniques
are admitted into criminal trials at all, it will most likely first occur in
the sentencing phase of capital punishment trials, given its relaxed
procedural standards.139
In an fMRI deception detection case of first impression, the
technology’s application was ruled inadmissible in the guilt phase of a
federal criminal trial under both FRE 702 and 403 in United States v.

133.
134.
135.
13.
136.

Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 309.
Id. at 309---12.
See Alexander, supra note 12, at 31---35; Greely & Illes, supra note 52, at 412---

See, e.g., Mary P. Brown & Steven E. Bunnell, Negotiating Justice:
Prosecutorial Perspectives on Federal Plea Bargaining in the District of Columbia, 43

AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1063, 1072 n.24 (2006) (mentioning the use of polygraph
technology in the context of plea bargaining and prosecutorial discretion).
137. See generally Jones & Shen, supra note 103, at 349 (discussing the legal use of
brain technology in several different contexts); Pettit, Jr., supra note 55, at 334---49.
For discussion of use of this technology in the civil context, see Jones et al., supra
note 58, at 2 (citing O. CARTER SNEAD, NEUROIMAGING AND THE COURTS:
STANDARD AND ILLUSTRATIVE CASE INDEX (2006)).
138. Virginia Hughes, Head Case, 464 NATURE 340, 341 (2010).
139. ‘‘Information is admissible regardless of its admissibility under the rules
governing admission of evidence at criminal trials except that information may be
excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of creating unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury.’’ 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (2012).
For a comprehensive discussion of neuroimaging within the capital punishment
context, see O. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the ‘‘Complexity’’ of Capital
Punishment, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1265 (2007).
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Semrau.140 Although the magistrate judge found that this technology
had satisfied Daubert’s falsifiability and peer review criteria,141 it was
deemed inadmissible under FRE 702 because it failed to satisfy the
other criteria; ‘‘real world’’ error rates were unknown,142 there was a
lack of controlling standards in the industry,143 and the method was
not yet generally accepted by the scientific community.144
The court also ruled the evidence inadmissible under FRE 403
because the tests were unilaterally conducted without informing the
government,145 the defendant sought to admit the results to bolster his
credibility before the jury on issues that were central to the case,146
and the expert witness could not testify to the truthfulness of any
specific statement made by the defendant.147 The presiding judge,
however, admitted that the technique might one day be admissible.148
The Sixth Circuit recently affirmed the decision.149
III. fMRI UNDER 403
The criteria set forth in Daubert are useful in assessing fMRI’s
probative value for the purposes of determining its admissibility
under FRE 403.150 Even though this Note is premised on the
assumption that this technology will eventually satisfy the
admissibility standards of FRE 702 under Daubert and its progeny, it

140. No. 07-10074 Ml/P., 2010 WL 6845092, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. June 1, 2010). fMRI
deception detection results were also deemed inadmissible in a New York criminal
case under the Frye standard. Wilson v. Corestaff Servs., L.P., 900 N.Y.S.2d 639, 640
(Sup. Ct. 2010).
141. Semrau, 2010 WL 6845092, at *10.
142. Id. at *11---12.
143. Id. at *13.
144. Id.
145. Id. at *4, *15---16 (noting that the defendant could have conducted the test and
never have disclosed the results if they were not favorable).
146. Id. at *15.
147. Id. at *16 (asserting that the expert’s ability to only offer an opinion on the
general truthfulness of answers to twenty questions as opposed to any specific
question would cause danger of unfair prejudice that substantially outweighs any
probative value of that opinion).
148. Id. at *12 n.18 (‘‘In the future, should fMRI-based lie detection undergo
further testing, development, and peer review, improve upon standards controlling
the technique’s operation, and gain acceptance by the scientific community for use in
the real world, this methodology may be found to be admissible even if the error rate
is not able to be quantified in a real world setting.’’).
149. United States v. Semrau, 693 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2012).
150. This approach was also taken in Brown & Murphy, supra note 48, at 1179--1206. The probative value is determined by Daubert’s factors, which are weighed
against FRE 403’s various concerns.
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is necessary to understand how these factors affect its probative
value.151 This Part will discuss each of these factors as they apply to
fMRI technology in turn.
A. FRE 702’s Probative Value Factors

1.

Testability

fMRI deception detection technology has generally satisfied

Daubert’s initial criterion: whether a technique is falsifiable and has
been properly tested.152 Even though Semrau accepted this criterion
as satisfied,153 others disagree, with some going as so far as saying that
this technique is not even truly testable under ethical constraints.154
For these critics, in order to satisfy this criterion, researchers would
have to get participants to commit a crime and prosecute them for
it.155 Further, the entire research field of fMRI deception detection
consists of approximately twenty studies, only four of which test
deception at the individual level, yielding results that are inconsistent
with one another and that have not been replicated.156

2.

Peer Review

fMRI technology has also generally satisfied Daubert’s second
criterion because the technique has been subjected to peer review
and publication.157 However, much of the peer review is critical of the
research: many doubt the reliability of existing results and conclusions
due to the lack of replication of most studies.158 Not only are the

151. Generally speaking, a majority of scholars that have weighed in on the
discussion agree that, given the research to date, fMRI deception detection should
not be admitted as substantive evidence in a court of law. See Adelsheim, supra note
97, at 886. For more in-depth discussion as to admissibility of deception detection
under the current state of fMRI technology, see, e.g., id. at 905---08; Law, supra note
86, at 37---44; Meixner, supra note 24, at 1476---87; Adam Teitcher, Note, Weaving

Functional Brain Imaging into the Tapestry of Evidence: A Case for Functional
Neuroimaging in Federal Criminal Courts, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 355 (2011).
152. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993). Falsifiability is the
quality of being able to be proven false, which is the single most defining
characteristic of science. Karl Popper, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE
GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed. 1989).
153. Semrau, 693 F.3d at 521.
154. See, e.g., Adelsheim, supra note 97, at 905---08; Kanwisher, supra note 90, at
12.
155. Adelsheim, supra note 97, at 906.
156. Id. at 907.
157. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
158. Adelsheim, supra note 97, at 900---01.
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reported results different across different labs, some researchers have
even had difficulty replicating their own results.159 Further, many of
the studies that support the technology’s reliability come from
scientists with financial interests in the studies’ outcomes160------a clear
conflict of interest by legal standards.161

3.

Known/Potential Rate of Error

The third factor set forth in Daubert, a technique’s known or
potential error rate,162 is the most controversial as applied to fMRI
technology. Indeed, the assessment and consequential admission of
scientific expert evidence under FRE 702 quite possibly hinges on this
factor,163 as it most directly relates to evidential reliability.164
Proponents assert that fMRI technology can accurately distinguish an
individual subject’s truthful response from a lie anywhere from
seventy-six percent in one study165 to ninety percent in another.166
However, critics are quick to point out many faults of the technology
and its application in those experiments.
The first set of problems this technology presents with regard to
error rates concerns its scientific validity: ‘‘does the principle support

159. See infra notes 187---96 and accompanying text for a discussion on reliability.
160. Jane C. Moriarty, Visions of Deception: Neuroimages and the Search for
Truth, 42 AKRON L. REV. 739, 759 (2009).
161. Several scientists who claim that the technology has successfully attained a
high level of accuracy are financially tied to its success. See Schauer, supra note 74, at
1202 n.53 (‘‘For example, Christos Davatzikos, the lead researcher of the Davatzikos
study . . . serves on the Science Board of No Lie MRI . . . . Similarly, Frank Kozel, the
lead researcher of the three Kozel studies . . . serves as a scientific advisor for
Cephos . . . . Finally, No Lie MRI uses technology and methods under a license from
Daniel Langleben, lead researcher on many other studies . . . .’’).
162. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
163. Schauer & Spellman, supra note 5, at 9.
164. ‘‘In a case involving scientific evidence, evidentiary reliability will be based
upon scientific validity.’’ Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.9 (noting ‘‘that scientists typically
distinguish between ‘validity’ . . . and ‘reliability’’’). The term ‘‘reliability’’ has similar
but distinct meanings in science and the law. See Schauer, supra note 74. Scientific
reliability is defined as having reproducible results. See Law, supra note 86, at 42.
Legal reliability is having the quality of ‘‘trustworthiness.’’ Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590
n.9.
165. Langleben et al., Telling Truth, supra note 74, at 271 (concluding that fMRI
images may be able to distinguish a truth from a lie on the basis that a lie ‘‘appears to
be a more working memory-intensive activity, characterized by increased activation
of the inferolateral cortex implicated in response selection, inhibition, and
generation’’).
166. Kozel et al., Detecting Deception, supra note 74, at 611 (concluding that
‘‘fMRI can be used to detect deception within a cooperative individual’’); see also,
Langleben & Moriarty, supra note 8, at 223.
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what it purports to show?’’167 One subset of scientific validity
problems comes from external and ecological validity168: extrapolating
results from a small number of test subjects to larger populations of
people,169 from the laboratory to the real world.170 There is a
fundamental difference in the foci of science and criminal law171:
science is mainly concerned with population-level characteristics,
while criminal law focuses mostly on the individual.172 Due to the
prohibitive cost of each scan,173 most studies and experiments done
with fMRI technology are done with a small number of subjects.174

167. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.9.
168. Although ecological and external validity are similar to each other and
sometimes interchangeably used, they are scientifically distinct concepts. Francis X.
Shen & Owen D. Jones, Brain Scans as Evidence: Truths, Proofs, Lies, and Lessons,
62 MERCER L. REV. 861, 876---77 (2011).
169. External validity is a measure of how much the experimental results can be
applied to the general population or individual of interest. Id. Concerns with the
external validity of most social science research, a concern not unique to deception
detection research, has to do with the scientific construction of ‘‘normal.’’ Brown &
Murphy, supra note 48, at 1149---51 (asserting that the group data to which an
individual is compared may not necessarily be ‘‘normal’’ and ‘‘[e]ven cutting-edge
science has a crude idea of what ‘normal’ means as captured by group data’’); Sydney
B. Roth, The Emergence of Neuroscience Evidence in Louisiana, 87 TUL. L. REV.
197, 215 (2012) (‘‘Being in a certain category of individuals, who might on average be
more (or less) susceptible to a certain outcome, does not necessarily mean that
everyone in that group of individuals is more (or less) likely to experience that
particular outcome.’’).
170. Ecological validity is a measure of how much experimental laboratory
conditions mirror the real world environment. Shen & Jones, supra note 168, at 876.
One scholar suggests that there might simply be ‘‘too great an analytical gap between
the data and the opinion proffered’’ for laboratory deception detection to ever be
applicable to real world lying. Adelsheim, supra note 97, at 902 (quoting Gen. Elec.
Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997)).
171. See generally Schauer, supra note 74 (discussing many of the differences
between science and the law).
172. Brown & Murphy, supra note 48, at 1182---83; David L. Faigman, A

Preliminary Exploration of the Problem of Reasoning From General Scientific Data
to Individualized Legal Decision-Making, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1115 (2010) (quoting
DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN THE
LAW 69 (1999)) (‘‘[W]hile science attempts to discover the universals hiding among
the particulars, trial courts attempt to discover the particulars hiding among the
universals.’’); Jones & Shen, supra note 103, at 356. For discussion of the use of
epidemiological data in proving causation, see Schauer, supra note 83, at 27 n.59.
173. As of 2009, two private companies, No Lie MRI and Cephos, offered fMRI
deception detection services at the cost of $4000 to $5000 per scan. See Henry T.
Greely, Law and the Revolution in Neuroscience: An Early Look at the Field, 42
AKRON L. REV. 687, 698 (2009).
174. See United States v. Semrau, No. 07---10074 Ml/P, 2010 WL 6845092, at *11
(W.D. Tenn. June 1, 2010); Gerard, supra note 20, at 28; Greely & Illes, supra note
52, at 403 (surveying all published fMRI lie detection research through 2006);
Schauer, supra note 74, at 1201. As of this publication, the largest subject group in
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Within these small sample sizes, there is very little cross-cultural
variation among the test subjects.175 Indeed, many of the test subjects
in these studies are healthy, upper/middle-class, white, right-handed,
male young adults,176 usually in undergraduate institutions.177 Further,
these non-diverse groups of test subjects often volunteer for these
studies, usually receiving class credit or financial compensation for
their participation.178 Most of these experiments focus on detecting
deception within the larger group of subjects, as opposed to
comparing a single individual’s responses, or those between
individuals.179

any peer-reviewed fMRI deception detection article was fifty-two subjects. See Lee et
al., Neural Correlates of Feigned Memory Impairment, 28 NEUROIMAGE 305---13
(2005). However, most experiments were conducted with fewer than thirty subjects.
See Spence, supra note 71, at 14---21 (surveying peer-reviewed lie detection research
through 2007).
175. Semrau, 2010 WL 6845092, at *12; Tommaso Bruni, Cross-Cultural Variation
and fMRI Lie-Detection, in TECHNOLOGIES ON THE STAND: LEGAL AND ETHICAL
QUESTIONS IN NEUROSCIENCE AND ROBOTICS 137, 140 (B. Van den Berg & L.
Klaming eds., 2011), available at http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=114416; Greely &
Illes, supra note 52, at 403 (stating that fMRI lie detection studies through 2006 had
little gender or ethnic diversity).
176. Adelsheim, supra note 97, at 899; see Greely & Illes, supra note 52, at 403
(discussing the importance of conducting experiments on representative samples).
fMRI deception detection research must be conducted on specific sub-populations in
order to increase its external validity, including pathological liars, mentally retarded
individuals, environmentally damaged individuals, and those with neurodegenerative
diseases. See Reese, supra note 2, at 219---27.
177. Joel D. Lieberman et al., Preface to ‘‘When Does Sample Matter in Juror

Decision-Making Research? Differences Between College Student and
Representative Samples of Jurors,’’ 29 BEHAV. SCI. L. 325, 325---26 (2011) (discussing
the applicability of research conducted on college students to the general
population). Few significant differences between college student and representative
samples have been found. Id. Several behavioral research studies generally conclude
that ‘‘well-designed experiments using subject pools with low incentives can be
reliable in predicting the behavior of people in general in real-world situations.’’
Schauer, supra note 83 (manuscript at 24). Further, concerns about the applicability
of studies that solely use undergraduates as test subjects is not unique to fMRI
experiments, as most behavioral studies utilize the same populations. Id. at 23.
178. See Semrau, 2010 WL 6845092, at *12; Craig A. Anderson, Research in the
Psychological Laboratory: Truth or Triviality?, 8 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL.
SCI. 3, 7 (1999) (asserting that using only undergraduates in experiments limits
individual differences, which in turn can exacerbate problems with both internal
validity and external reliability); Schauer, supra note 74, at 1207.
179. As of this publication, only four out of approximately twenty known fMRI lie
detection experiments have been conducted at the individual level. See, e.g.,
Davatzikos et al., supra note 74, at 663; Kozel et al., Detecting Deception, supra note
74, at 611; Kozel et al., Pilot Study, supra note 74, at 303; Langleben et al., Telling
Truth, supra note 74, at 262. For the importance of distinguishing results on the
individual level from the group or population level, see Greely & Illes, supra note 52,
at 402.
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A separate but related subset of scientific validity problems stem
from the manner in which these experiments are set up, which is
called construct validity. Construct validity is the idea that an
experiment actually measures what it purports to measure.180 The
largest problem for fMRI is related to the aforementioned incentive
problem: those who volunteer for the studies have a different, and
substantially lesser, motivation to lie than criminals who would be
criminally investigated with this technology.181 Almost all of the
studies that analyze deception have been conducted in controlled
laboratory settings, where the results would undoubtedly be more
accurate.182 No research has been done during actual criminal activity
or its ensuing investigation,183 mainly due to physical and ethical
constraints.184 Some critics even attack the construct validity of many
of these experiments on the grounds that test subjects only lie when
instructed to do so, which, they contend, is different than a real lie.185

180. Schauer, supra note 74, at 1201.
181. See Semrau, 2010 WL 6845092, at *12 (‘‘Many studies entail little motivation
or jeopardy at all, while the motivation (e.g. $50 for successful deception) or jeopardy
(revealing personal autobiographical information) in other studies is not equivalent
to what would be at stake in real applications.’’) (citations omitted).
182. Id.
183. David P. McCabe et. al., The Influence of fMRI Lie Detection Evidence on
Juror Decision-Making, 29 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 566, 567 (2011).
184. Kanwisher, supra note 90, at 12. One ethical constraint is that, in order to
truly test the veracity of this technology’s results, experimenters would have to
actually know of the commission of a crime and test the criminal before such
technology would be permitted as evidence. This creates an ethical dilemma because
the experimenters have knowledge of a crime, but would not be permitted to testify
to the results in order to conduct clinical trials in fMRI’s application to deception
detection. See, e.g., Hakun et al., supra note 75, at 519. One physical constraint is the
fact that this technology has not been installed in any police precinct due to its
prohibitive cost and size, so alleged criminals would have to be transported to and
from a laboratory with all the necessary safety precautions that come along with such
transportation.
185. Greely & Illes, supra note 52, at 404 (‘‘Are lies about participation in a crime
the same as lies about the quality of a meal or the existence of a ‘prior engagement’?
Do lies about sex activate the same regions of the brain as lies about money, lies to
avoid embarrassment, or lies about the five of clubs? Do lies of omission look the
same under fMRI as lies of commission?’’); Kamila E. Sip et al., Detecting
Deception: The Scope and Limits, 12 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 48, 50---51 (2008)
(arguing that most of these studies have only shown ‘‘instructed lies’’ and not real
deception); cf. Schauer, supra note 74, at 1201, 1208 (arguing that even though the
difference between instructed lies and real lies poses a ‘‘significant construct validity
problem,’’ the results of these experiments would be completely valueless ‘‘only if
there were no correlation at all between causes of the brain activity involved in the
real lie and those involved in the instructed lie.’’); Schauer, supra note 83 (manuscript
at 25. But see, e.g., Joshua D. Greene & Joseph M. Paxton, Patterns of Neural
Activity Associated with Honest and Dishonest Moral Decisions, 106 PROC. NAT’L
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Further, while not as vulnerable as polygraph technology, some
evidence suggests that fMRI technology is still susceptible to
countermeasures.186
A distinct set of problems with regard to fMRI’s known error rate
is its reliability,187 which is defined as having reproducible results.188
For lie detection, this entails having the same neurological regions
activated by lies to the same question, in four different contexts: (1)
by individuals within a single experimental session; (2) by the same
individual among different experimental sessions; (3) among different
individuals in the same experimental session; and (4) among different
individuals in different experimental sessions.189 Only a handful of
studies attempt to discern lies at the individual level; the majority
average responses from a group of subjects.190 Most lie detection
studies have not yet been replicated,191 and some replication attempts
have even turned up completely contrary results.192
Further,
experimenters in this field use different research paradigms, so their
results may not apply to one another’s’ research.193 One scholar
argues that the law might be better served by having different
reliability standards for evidential admissibility, based on the
purposes of the evidence.194 In this hypothetical regime, a principle

ACAD. SCI. 12506, 12506 (2009) (describing a study involving genuine dishonesty with
subject choice); Spence et al., Speaking of Secrets, supra note 74, at 1411 (conducting
a study allowing test subjects to choose when to lie to protect against the potential
confounding variable of results reflecting subjects performing instructed actions).
186. Ganis et al., supra note 90, at 312 (experimental results showing that subjects
can be trained to confound deception detection). In an experiment that involved
deceptively answering questions with their fingers, countermeasures included: ‘‘to
move imperceptibly (i.e., without any overt movement that could be observed) the
left index finger, the middle left finger, and the left toe.’’ Id. at 313.
187. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 590 n.9 (1993). (‘‘[D]oes
application of the principle produce consistent results?’’) The Daubert Court may
have originally intended for this criterion to be left out of admissibility
determinations of scientific evidence, specifically stating that ‘‘evidentiary reliability
will be based upon scientific validity,’’ despite first acknowledging that validity and
reliability were two distinct, albeit similar, concepts. Id.
188. Langleben & Moriarty, supra note 8, at 229.
189. Id. A single experimental session would be a group of individuals being a part
of an experiment at the same time, in the same place, while different sessions would
occur at different times, and possibly in different places. Id.
190. See Greely & Illes, supra note 52, at 402.
191. Id. (‘‘A good rule of thumb is to never believe a result until at least one
investigator from outside the original group confirms it. Lie detection through fMRI
does not pass this test.’’); Spence, supra note 71, at 24.
192. Spence, supra note 71, at 24.
193. Id. at 13.
194. Schauer, supra note 74, at 1205.
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piece of evidence that will be used as a cornerstone of a party’s case
would be subject to a higher bar of reliability before admission.195 On
the other hand, if proffered evidence is just a ‘‘piece of the puzzle,’’
then it should be subject to lower standards because a ‘‘brick is not a
wall.’’196

4.

Existence/Maintenance of Standards

fMRI has probably not satisfied the next Daubert criterion,197
which is the existence and maintenance of standards controlling a
technique’s operation.198 As previously mentioned, fMRI technology
only shows the movement of deoxygenated blood throughout the
brain: this movement still requires much interpretation as to what
may properly be deduced.199 At least one critic points out that there is
currently little consistency or transparency as to the standards in this
field, or, at the least, that the standards are manipulable.200 Even
though fMRI results are less susceptible to subjective interpretation,
researchers exercise subjective discretion in creating the results
themselves.201

5.

General Acceptance in the Scientific Community

While the scientific community generally has accepted the use of
fMRI technology, courts have held that its use for lie detection

195. Id. at 1205 n.77 (asserting that higher standards of reliability should be shown
when evidence such as DNA identification principally determines whether a
defendant goes to jail).
196. Id. (quoting 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185, at 729 (Kenneth S. Broun ed.,
6th ed. 2006) (analogizing each piece of evidence to a brick in a wall that a defendant
tries to build in his defense)).
197. Adelsheim, supra note 97, at 908 (‘‘[T]here simply are no standard techniques
at this time.’’).
198. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993).
199. See Adelsheim, supra note 97, at 888---95, 908 (discussing BOLD fMRI and its
inherent weaknesses); Brown & Murphy, supra note 48, at 1138---41, 1188 (discussing
the various layers along the chain of inferences that must be made in order to create
an fMRI image and deduce conclusions from it).
200. Brown & Murphy, supra note 48, at 1153 (‘‘Statistical thresholds can therefore
be manipulated . . . . If a party does not like the results that are shown at a certain
level of zoom, simply altering the statistical precision may provide a more compelling
image for one’s legal argument.’’); Law, supra note 86, at 54 (musing that a proponent
can pay an expert to ‘‘find’’ certain results by ‘‘simply adjusting the statistical
thresholds or the baseline task’’).
201. Brown & Murphy, supra note 48, at 1195 (analogizing fMRI images to
paintings instead of photographs, since ‘‘[u]nlike photographs, the visual properties of
functional brain images are instantiated by the use of texture, shading, perspective,
and color’’).
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purposes fails the last Daubert criterion of admissibility.202 While
some researchers think that it has reached this level,203 others believe
that there should be a moratorium on all non-research use of this
fMRI deception detection technology until standards can be
established and the field regulated.204 Still others question why the
law is using scientific norms and standards to govern the legal realm
at all.205 Broadly speaking, there is little general acceptance within the
small field of fMRI deception detection researchers, much less the
entire scientific community.206 One researcher, who even holds a
patent for this technique and stands to financially profit from its
success, has publicly stated that it is not yet ready for deployment in
the real world.207
B.

Unfair Prejudice: Will the Jury Overvalue This Evidence?

The first factor that must be weighed against the potential
probative value of fMRI technology is its potential for unfair
prejudice.208 Relevant and probative evidence can be barred from
admission if the jury would accord such evidence with weight
disproportionate to its objective value.209 Fear of jury overvaluation
lies at the heart of much of the exclusion of admittedly relevant
evidence, especially expert testimony.210 However, evidence shows
that people do not overvalue neuroscientific images.211 On the other
hand, jurors have been shown in fact to overvalue other types of
evidence that are heavily relied upon, especially eyewitness testimony
and forensic individualization (including DNA profiling).212 This Part
examines jurors’ views of this technology in more depth.

202. United States v. Semrau, No. 07---10074 Ml/P, 2010 WL 6845092, at *13 (W.D.
Tenn. June 1, 2010); see Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
203. See, e.g., Teitcher, supra note 151, at 366.
204. See Greely & Illes, supra note 52, at 413.
205. See generally Schauer, supra note 74, at 1191, 1202---09; Schauer & Spellman,
supra note 5.
206. Adelsheim, supra note 97, at 908.
207. Id. at 905---06, 908 (citing Moriarty, supra note 160, at 748).
208. FED. R. EVID. 403.
209. Richard D. Friedman, Minimizing the Jury Over-Valuation Concern, 2003
MICH. ST. L. REV. 967, 968.
210. See Schauer & Spellman, supra note 5, at 5.
211. See infra Part III.B.1.
212. See infra Part III.B.2.
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Jurors Will Not Overvalue Neuroimaging Evidence

Initial scholarship gave credence to the idea that people were
overly swayed by neuroscientific explanations and imagery.213 Those
who claim that neuroscientific evidence would have an undue
influence on jury members pointed to a ‘‘Christmas tree
phenomenon,’’214 in that juries would be excessively persuaded by
such images because they would be presented in the form of beautiful
graphs with many bright colors.215 These claims began even before
the advent of fMRI technology.216 Several studies outlined below
have attempted to show how fMRI imaging would engender unfair
prejudice. Almost all of these studies, however, suffer from various
external and construct validity problems,217 and none of them found
the undue prejudice they sought.

a.

Gurley & Marcus (2008)

An early study, conducted by Jessica R. Gurley and David K.
Marcus, contended that jurors were more likely to return a result of
‘‘not guilty by reason of insanity’’ when presented with structural
images of brain damage to defendants.218 There are several reasons
why this study is not applicable to fMRI lie detection. First, the
experiment uses structural images, which depicts the brain at rest,219
as opposed to the functional time-lapse images that fMRI provides
when subjecting subjects to tasks, which is the subject of this Note.
Second, the experiment failed to dissociate the brain images from the

213. See, e.g., Joseph Dumit, Objective Brains, Prejudicial Images, 12 SCI.
CONTEXT 173 (1999).
214. Dean Mobbs et al., Law, Responsibility, and the Brain, 5 PUB. LIBR. SCI.
BIOLOGY 0693, 0699 (2007), available at http://www.plosbiology.org/article/
fetchObject.action?uri=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pbio.0050103&represent
ation=PDF.
215. Kevin Davis, Brain Trials: Neuroscience Is Taking a Stand in the Courtroom,
A.B.A. J. (Nov. 1, 2012), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/brain_trials_
neuroscience_is_taking_a_stand_in_the_courtroom; see also Gerard, supra note 20,
at 28---29.
216. Dumit, supra note 213, at 175, 180, 187 (discussing images created by
computerized tomography (CT) and positron emission tomography (PET)).
217. For a discussion on external and construct validity, see supra notes 168---94 and
accompanying text.
218. Jessica R. Gurley & David K. Marcus, The Effects of Neuroimaging and Brain
Injury on Insanity Defenses, 26 BEHAV. SCI. L. 85, 93 (2008).
219. McCabe et al., supra note 183, at 568.
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expert testimony;220 thus, the question of whether it was the testimony
or the images that produced the effect cannot be determined.221

b.

Weisberg et al. (2008)

Another study, conducted by Deena S. Weisberg et al., asserted
that people were more likely to believe explanations of events when
they included neuroscientific language than the same explanations
without such language.222
However, the authors themselves
recognized the major limitation of their findings, stating, ‘‘people may
be responding to some more general property of the neuroscience
information.’’223 Most importantly, this study did not even measure
the effect of brain images.224 Further, subjects were not tested in a
legal setting.225

c.

McCabe & Castel (2008)

A third study, conducted by David P. McCabe and Alan D. Castel,
argued that neuroscientific explanations were more influential when
accompanied by brain images than when accompanied by bar
graphs.226 There were several problems with these results. First,
subjects were asked to compare articles with brain images in each part
of the experiment; there was no control condition in which a subject
was asked to evaluate the article without a brain image altogether.227

220. Adina L. Roskies et al., Neuroimages in Court: Less Biasing than Feared, 17
TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 99, 99 (2013), available at http://download.cell.com/
trends/cognitive-sciences/pdf/PIIS1364661313000223.pdf?intermediate=true.
221. Id. (citing N.J. Schweitzer & Michael J. Saks, Neuroimage Evidence and the
Insanity Defense, 29 BEHAV. SCI. L. 592, 596---97 (2011)); N.J. Schweitzer et al.,
Neuroimages as Evidence in a Mens Rea Defense: No Impact, 17 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 357, 361 (2011) [hereinafter Schweitzer et al., No Impact] (stating that the
experiments ‘‘confounded the presentation of neuroimagery with additional verbal
testimony’’).
222. Deena S. Weisberg et al., The Seductive Allure of Neuroscience Explanations,
20 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 470, 476 (2008).
223. Id.
224. Martha J. Farah & Cayce J. Hook, The Seductive Allure of ‘‘Seductive
Allure,’’ 8 PERSP. PSYCHOL. SCI. 88, 89 (2013); Roskies et al., supra note 220, at 99;
Schweitzer et al., No Impact, supra note 221, at 361.
225. Roskies et al., supra note 220, at 99; Schweitzer et al., No Impact, supra note
221, at 360.
226. David P. McCabe & Alan D. Castel, Seeing Is Believing: The Effect of Brain
Images on Judgments of Scientific Reasoning, 107 COGNITION 343 (2008).
227. Robert B. Michael et al., On the (Non)persuasive Power of a Brain Image,
PSYCHONOMIC BULL. REV. (Feb. 2013), http://www.researchgate.net/publication/
235523242_On_the_(non)persuasive_power_of_a_brain_image. A growing body of
evidence suggests that any kind of image increases probative value of accompanying
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Second, much like the pitfall in the Gurley and Marcus study, the
neuroscience language contained in the study likely already
influenced subjects;228 this Note is concerned with the effect of
imaging. Moreover, critics argue that the images themselves weren’t
equivalent to each other.229 Additionally, this experiment was not
conducted in a legal setting.230 Perhaps most importantly, when the
raw data from this experiment and an attempted replication of it were
combined, other researchers suggested that McCabe and Castel’s
purported conclusions were unsubstantiated.231 That is, when other
experimenters attempted to replicate the study’s results, they instead
found that the brain image exerted ‘‘little to no independent influence
on juror verdicts.’’232

d.

McCabe et al. (2011)

A fourth study, conducted by David P. McCabe et al., suggested
that verbally offered fMRI lie detection evidence was more influential
than lie detection evidence yielded from polygraph or thermal facial
imaging technology offered in the same form.233 This experiment’s
major shortcoming is that it fails to compare the effect of such verbal
evidence with the effect of neuroimages234: verbal neuroscientific
evidence is already permissible from expert witnesses in criminal
cases.235 Much like the limitation of the Weisberg et al. experiment,
this study does not measure the effect of fMRI imaging. Of further
note, this influence was negated when the technology’s scientific

propositions. See Feigenson, supra note 93, at 233 (discussing the inflation of
probative value enjoyed by all visual images). See generally Lucille A. Jewel,

Through A Glass Darkly: Using Brain Science and Visual Rhetoric to Gain a
Professional Perspective on Visual Advocacy, 19 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 237, 245
(2010) (discussing the advantages of visual advocacy).
228. See Michael et al., supra note 227.
229. Farah & Hook, supra note 224, at 88 (stating that it was ‘‘not strictly true’’ that
the illustrations used in these two conditions were ‘‘informationally equivalent’’).
230. See Roskies et al., supra note 220, at 1; see also Schweitzer et al., No Impact,
supra note 221, at 361 (‘‘[J]udgments of the participants in these experiments [were]
made without the competing overlay of crime-guilt-punishment.’’).
231. Michael et al., supra note 227, at 2. The compilation of raw data from
identical, yet separately conducted, experiments is called a ‘‘meta-analysis.’’ Meixner,
supra note 24, at 1466 n.107.
232. Michael et al., supra note 227, at 5.
233. See McCabe et al., supra note 183, at 574 (2011) (stating additionally that fact
patterns containing fMRI lie detection evidence was more influential than fact
patterns without any such evidence).
234. See id. at 571.
235. See O. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the ‘‘Complexity’’ of Capital
Punishment, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1265, 1272 (2007).
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validity was called into question within the experiment’s fact
pattern.236

e.

Greene & Cahill (2012)

Another study, conducted by Edith Greene and Brian S. Cahill,
argued that mock jurors were less likely to recommend a sentence of
death for defendants at high risk of future dangerousness when given
neuropsychological and neuroimaging evidence than when they were
given neither.237
However, visual representations of brain
abnormalities did not have a more profound impact on jurors’
decisions than neuropsychological testing results alone.238 The
authors suggested that any additional information may have affected
the jurors decisions.239 According to these scholars, ‘‘[w]hen [brain
scans] do have an impact . . . it is no greater than the impact of
neuropsychological testing data that have been available for many
decades.’’240

f.

Schweitzer et al. (2011)

The most compelling study exploring the undue influence of
neuroimagery found that neuroimagery did not affect jurors’
judgments any more than verbal neuroscience-based testimony.241
Several scholars understood the shortcomings of the aforementioned
experiments, and undertook to try to expand or replicate them.242
The four experiments within the study were designed to account for
all of the variables that may have confounded the results of the
aforementioned studies.243 ‘‘In each successive experiment[,] the

236. See McCabe et al., supra note 183, at 574. See infra Part III.C.5 for a
discussion on cross-examination and its effects.
237. See Edith Greene & Brian S. Cahill, Effects of Neuroimaging Evidence on
Mock Juror Decision Making, 30 BEHAV. SCI. L. 280, 293 (2012).
238. See id.
239. See id. (‘‘It may be that any additional information pertinent to the
defendant’s physical and emotional disposition has the effect of personalizing him to
jurors and enhancing their impressions of him . . . .’’).
240. Id. at 294 (emphasis added); see also Schauer, supra note 83, (manuscript at
37---38) (‘‘The precise question to be asked about fMRI evidence therefore,
is . . . whether the inflated value they produce is greater than the inflated value
produced by the visual evidence that the legal system routinely admits.’’).
241. See Schweitzer et al., No Impact, supra note 221.
242. See Law, supra note 86, at 53 (‘‘When the general population relies on
primary experimental findings rather than review articles and textbook knowledge,
scientists must become proactive.’’).
243. See Schweitzer et al., No Impact, supra note 221, at 365 (describing the study’s
numerous control conditions). Experimenters conducted the experiments in a legal
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pressures on mock jurors to find guilt [were reduced] (thus potentially
liberating them to be increasingly open to influence from the
neuroimage evidence).’’244 Even though most of the authors of this
study expected these images to unduly influence the mock jurors,245
they concluded, ‘‘neuroimages had no especially potent or consistent
impact on verdicts or sentences.’’246 Describing this turn of events,
another scholar stated, ‘‘[g]iven the visual appeal of images and their
high-tech origins, the idea that they are inordinately persuasive is
plausible. This a priori plausibility may have reduced scrutiny of the
experimental designs and results that seem to support it.’’247

2.

Jurors Currently Overvalue Other Types of Evidence

Jurors currently ascribe more weight than they should to certain
kinds of admissible evidence based on that evidence’s lack of
objective value. As explained in the sections below, eyewitness
testimony is notoriously unreliable, and yet it is continuously
admitted, and strongly relied upon by jurors. Jurors also award
excessive weight to forensic evidence, such as fingerprint and DNA
evidence.

a.

Eyewitness Testimony

Empirical research has effectively established that eyewitness
testimony is unreliable.248 Humans have limited cognitive capacities

setting. See id. The ‘‘neuroimage condition,’’ where a subject would be shown a brain
scan as well as having it described by accompanying testimony based on the brain
scan, was compared to various other control groups: (1) one group hearing the
identical neuroscience expert testimony accompanied by a graphical depiction of the
defendant’s brain function; (2) one group hearing the identical neuroscience expert
testimony accompanied by a generic image of an empty courtroom; (3) one group
hearing an expert witness’ testimony that had the same substantive conclusions and
diagnoses as the previous group, but which was based on non-neuroimaging
techniques; (4) one group hearing the expert witness testimony of a clinical
psychologist; and (5) the control group, with the absence of expert testimony
altogether. Id.
244. Id. at 387.
245. See id. at 388.
246. Id. at 387.
247. Farah & Hook, supra note 224, at 89 (asserting that the cognitive heuristic of
‘‘confirmation bias’’ may have clouded some experimenters’ judgments and
conclusions).
248. See Richard S. Schmechel et al., Beyond the Ken? Testing Jurors’
Understanding of Eyewitness Reliability Evidence, 46 JURIMETRICS 177, 179 (2006)
(citing Saul Kassin et al., On the ‘‘General Acceptance’’ of Eyewitness Testimony
Research: A New Survey of the Experts, 56 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 405, 413---14 (2001))
(asserting that a 2001 survey of established eyewitness researchers found nearly
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and are subject to biases and limitations,249 including, importantly,
those of memory and perception,250 which lead them to be poor
eyewitnesses.251 Among other findings, studies have shown that
human memory is malleable and rather ephemeral;252 people are far
better at recognizing the faces of people in their own race than they
are those of a different race,253 and a witness’ confidence has little to
no correlation with the accuracy of his or her testimony.254
Jurors have very little awareness of these findings, despite the fact
that they have been widely established for some period of time.255
Perhaps most importantly, most people have very little understanding
of the stages and faults of human memory storage and recall,256
leading them to grossly overestimate a witness’ ability to retain
memories.257
Even judges and attorneys themselves are not
completely familiar with the shortcomings of eyewitness testimony.258

unanimously that several findings of eyewitness testimony deficiencies were reliable
and established in scientific literature).
249. See Chris W. Sanchirico, ‘‘What Makes the Engine Go?’’ Cognitive
Limitations and Cross-Examination, 14 WIDENER L. REV. 507, 510 n.10 (citing over
twenty empirical studies and articles that point out how various cognitive limitations
and biases cause people to be poor witnesses).
250. See Schauer & Spellman, supra note 5, at 12, nn.40, 42---43 (citing many
sources that point to the fact that witness perception is poor and not nearly as reliable
as most people believe).
251. See id. (asserting that the shortcomings in perception and memory may
contribute to the negative effects).
252. See generally Henry F. Fradella, Why Judges Should Admit Expert
Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Testimony, 2007 FED. CTS. L. REV. 3
(2007); see also Jacob L. Zerkle, I Never Forget A Face: New Jersey Sets the
Standard in Eyewitness Identification Reform, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 357 (2012).
253. See Tara Anthony et al., Cross-Racial Facial Identification: A Social
Cognitive Integration, 18 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 296 (1992).
254. See Jennifer L. Overbeck, Beyond Admissibility: A Practical Look At the Use
of Eyewitness Expert Testimony in the Federal Courts, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1895,
1900---01 (2005). Other findings include: (1) stressful situations reduce a person’s
ability to successfully recall facial details; (2) witnesses overestimate how long it took
for an event to unfold; and (3) the presentation format affects recall ability because a
person is more likely to misidentify a defendant if he is presented in a group. See
Schmechel et al., supra note 250, at 178.
255. See Schmechel et al., supra note 248, at 192.
256. See generally Fradella, supra note 252; Zerkle, supra note 252.
257. See Overbeck, supra note 254, at 1904. This is especially true when
eyewitnesses display confidence in their memory. See Schauer & Spellman, supra
note 5.
258. See Richard A. Wise & Martin A. Safer, A Survey of Judges’ Knowledge and
Beliefs About Eyewitness Testimony, 40 CT. REV. 6, 9 (2003) (showing that twothirds of judges surveyed gave incorrect answers for three out of six questions that
assess understanding of the link between eyewitness confidence and accuracy).
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Given the shortcomings in eyewitness testimony, and the lack of
general awareness of those shortcomings, jurors tend to overvalue the
intrinsic worth of such evidence.259 Jurors place more weight on
eyewitness testimony than on other types of evidence, and are
substantially more likely to convict defendants when they hear such
testimony than when none is available.260 Before the development of
forensic DNA testing, mistaken eyewitness identifications were
responsible for the convictions of more innocent persons than any
other combination of factors.261 More recent studies of conviction
reversals due to DNA testing indicate that a significant percentage of
these reversals involved an eyewitness identification that turned out
to false262------in some studies, as much as eighty-five percent263-----making eyewitness testimony the ‘‘single greatest cause of wrongful
convictions in this country.’’264
For this reason, courts have
increasingly permitted expert testimony that addresses the inaccuracy
of eyewitness testimony, human memory, and false confessions.265

b.

Forensic Evidence

Forensic science is continuously admitted under Daubert and FRE
702 with very little hesitation, despite its deficiencies and lack of

259. See Overbeck, supra note 254, at 1903---04; Schauer & Spellman, supra note 5,
at 28; Schmechel et al., supra note 248, at 193---204 (citing a study that showed a
substantial majority of a thousand-person jury pool in the District of Columbia
lacked a meaningful understanding of eyewitness deficiencies and overestimated the
value of eyewitness testimony as a result).
260. See Overbeck, supra note 254, at 1897---98.
261. See Jacqueline McMurtrie, The Role of the Social Sciences in Preventing
Wrongful Convictions, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1271, 1275 n.18 (2005) (citing several
studies of wrongful convictions that suggested that a majority of them involved false
eyewitness testimony).
262. See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 60
(2008) (stating that seventy-nine percent of the first 200 people exonerated by postconviction DNA testing were convicted using incorrect eyewitness testimony); see
also Overbeck, supra note 254, at 1896 n.2 (citing studies that showed that two-thirds
of total exonerations were in cases where convictions were based at least in part on
faulty eyewitness identifications).
263. See Wes R. Porter, Repeating, Yet Evading Review: Admitting Reliable
Expert Testimony in Criminal Cases Still Depends Upon Who Is Asking, 36
RUTGERS L. REC. 48, 52 n.28 (2009) (citing McMurtrie, supra note 261, at 1275 n.17)
(asserting that false eyewitness testimony accounted for as much as eighty-five
percent of convictions later exonerated by DNA testing).
264. See Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 738 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (citing State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 886 (N.J. 2011)).
265. See Pardo, supra note 23, at 318; see also Schauer & Spellman, supra note 5, at
13. See generally Schmechel et al., supra note 250, at 178 (discussing various legal
trends that have contributed to reforms in the use of eyewitness identification).
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scientific validity.266 Forensic individualization methods, most notably
fingerprint and DNA analysis, rely on statistic probabilities and
subjects’ individuality in order to match a piece of evidence with its
origin.267 DNA typing was recognized as a large breakthrough for
criminal investigation immediately after its advent in the 1980s268:
some scholars have even asserted that DNA typing technology paved
the way for the Daubert decision’s overhaul in expert witness
testimony admissibility standards.269
Ironically, even though
proponents of DNA technology assert that fingerprinting is currently
more reliable than DNA,270 some scholars assert that fingerprinting
technology might be deemed inadmissible if its admission were sought
under the current Daubert standard.271 Accordingly, DNA evidence
is now touted as the ‘‘gold standard’’ of evidence.272
Despite this ‘‘aura of credibility,’’ forensic individualization is not
without shortcomings.273 Even though some scholars still challenge

266. For an in-depth discussion on the shortcomings of forensic science and the
expected disparity in admissibility standards when defendants will seek to admit
fMRI technology, see generally Teitcher, supra note 151.
267. See id. at 375---85 (listing other bases of methods and evidence including shoe
prints, bite marks, tool marks, firearms, handwriting, and hair samples).
268. See Brooke G. Malcom, Convictions Predicated on DNA Evidence Alone:
How Reliable Evidence Became Infallible, 38 CUMB. L. REV. 313, 313 (2008).
269. See Margaret A. Berger, Expert Testimony in Criminal Proceedings:
Questions Daubert Does Not Answer, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1125, 1129 (2003); see
also David L. Faigman, The Tipping Point in the Law’s Use of Science: The Epidemic
of Scientific Sophistication that Began with DNA Profiling and Toxic Torts, 67
BROOK. L. REV. 111, 112 (2001).
270. See COMM. ON DNA TECH. IN FORENSIC SCI., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 157 (1992).
271. See Berger, supra note 269, at 1139. ‘‘Looked at through the lens of Daubert,
fingerprints clearly should not be admissible and yet fingerprint matches obviously
are often accurate and corroborated by other evidence.’’ Id. Despite the fact that
‘‘there seem[s] to be an endless number of possible permutations consisting of loops,
whorls, arches and deltas,’’ the theory that this ‘‘abundance of detail probably makes
each individual’s fingerprint pattern unique . . . has never been scientifically verified.’’
Id.; see also, Roger C. Park & Michael J. Saks, Evidence Scholarship Reconsidered:
Results of the Interdisciplinary Turn, 47 B.C. L. REV. 949, 981---82 (2006) (‘‘What
lawyers, scholars, and the courts are discovering is that some kinds of evidence, most
notably some of the forensic sciences, which had been all but unquestioned under
older admissibility tests, appeared to have startling weaknesses when viewed through
the lens of the new test.’’). See generally, Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet
Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint ‘‘Science’’ is Revealed, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 605
(2002).
272. See Joseph L. Peterson & Anna S. Leggett, The Evolution of Forensic
Science: Progress Amid the Pitfalls, 36 STETSON L. REV. 621, 654 (2007).
273. See Jason Schklar & Shari S. Diamond, Juror Reactions to DNA Evidence:
Errors and Expectations, 23 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 159, 159 (1999).
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the individualization theory underlying forensic science generally,274
and many of these methods have little to no scientific basis,275 the
applications to DNA, and fingerprint analysis to a lesser extent,276
have generally been proven reliable.277 Yet, there is a general lack of
standardization and regulation within and among fields of forensic
science.278 Further, given that experts must interpret the evidence,
there is the omnipresent specter of human error279 and susceptibility
to psychological biases.280
For example, in one study, when
fingerprint examiners were given the same set of fingerprints again,
examiners reached different conclusions ten percent of the time.281
Forensic experts have often failed to conduct adequate testing, or
improperly exaggerate warranted conclusions from the data.282 In
fact, some form of invalid or improper forensic evidence may have
contributed to over half of the original convictions later exonerated
by DNA evidence.283

274. See Jonathan J. Koehler & Michael J. Saks, Individualization Claims in
Forensic Science: Still Unwarranted, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1187, 1192 (2010) (asserting
that the ability of any forensic science, with the notable exception of DNA typing, to
individualize any material as completely unique has never been proven).
275. See generally David L. Faigman, Anecdotal Forensics, Phrenology, and Other
Abject Lessons from the History of Science, 59 HASTINGS L. J. 979 (2008); see also
Teitcher, supra note 151, at 379 & n.217.
276. See Andrew C. Bernasconi, Beyond Fingerprinting: Indicting DNA Threatens
Criminal Defendants’ Constitutional and Statutory Rights, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 979,
1009 (2001) (‘‘Researchers theoretically have the ability to obtain and analyze all of
the information fingerprints provide.’’).
277. See Teitcher, supra note 151, at 382 & n.243 (citing COMM. ON IDENTIFYING
THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIS. CMTY., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCES IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 7
(2009) [hereinafter NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC
SCIENCES]).
278. See id. at 382 & n.244 (citing NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING
FORENSIC SCIENCES, supra note 277, at 7---8).
279. See Berger, supra note 269, at 1129.
280. See Itiel E. Dror & Simon A. Cole, The Vision in Blind Justice: Expert
Perception, Judgment, and Visual Cognition in Forensic Pattern Recognition, 17
PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 161, 162 (2010), available at http://dx.doi.org/
10.3758/PBR.17.2.161; see also Itiel E. Dror & Robert Rosenthal, Meta-Analytically
Quantifying the Reliability and Biasability of Forensic Experts, 53 J. FORENSIC SCI.
900, 900 (2008).
281. See Bradford T. Ulery et al., Repeatability and Reproducibility of Decisions
by Latent Fingerprint Examiners, 7 PUB. LIBR. SCI. ONE e32800, 1 (2012), available
at http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0032800.
282. See Saul M. Kassin et al., The Forensic Confirmation Bias: Problems,
Perspectives, and Proposed Solutions, 2 J. APPLIED RES. MEMORY & COGNITION 42,
43 (2013).
283. See id. (citing BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG (Harvard Univ. Press ed., 2011)); see also,
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Because of its deficiencies, jurors have a propensity to overvalue
forensic evidence------even DNA profiling.284 One study showed that,
without adequate explanation, many jurors are not able to accurately
assess the reliability of DNA profiling methods.285 Despite this
weakness, jurors in the same study that had greater pretrial trust in
DNA evidence were more likely to convict the defendant.286
Alarmingly, in another study, the ‘‘increase in [jurors’] perceived
probative value [of all the evidence] was most prominent when the
DNA evidence was of a moderate or weak standard.’’287 Some mock
jurors in yet another study practically disregarded statistically
significant laboratory error rates when given an extremely low
‘‘random match probability;’’288 this was probably caused at least
partially by the difficulty many jurors face when trying to
comprehend statistical information.289 Prosecutors exacerbate the
problem with various misstatements and exaggerations.290
C.

Confusing the Issue

The second factor under FRE 403 that must be weighed against the
probative value of the use of fMRI for detection of deception under is
its potential to confuse the jury,291 or even judges.

1.

Juror Problems

Evidence shows that jurors’ fact-finding abilities are generally
sound.292 From there, however, empirical evidence paints a much
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCES, supra note 277, at
42 (noting that forensic science had led to a ‘‘disturbing number of wrongful
convictions’’).
284. See Joel D. Lieberman et al., Gold Versus Platinum: Do Jurors Recognize the

Superiority and Limitations of DNA Evidence Compared to Other Types of Forensic
Evidence?, 14 PYSCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 27, 56---57 (2008).
285. See id. at 50.
286. See id. at 52.
287. Lisa L. Smith et al., Understanding Juror Perceptions of Forensic Evidence:
Investigating the Impact of Case Context on Perceptions of Forensic Evidence
Strength, 56 J. FORENSIC SCI. 409, 413 (2011) (emphasis added).
288. See Jonathan J. Koehler et al., The Random Match Probability in DNA
Evidence: Irrelevant and Prejudicial?, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 201, 216 (1995).
289. See infra notes 292---99 and accompanying text.
290. See Koehler et al., supra note 288, at 211 n.39 (giving examples of
prosecutorial claims, such as ‘‘DNA is infallible,’’ or ‘‘an incorrect match is
impossible’’).
291. FED R. EVID. 403.
292. See Joe S. Cecil et al., Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: Lessons
From Civil Jury Trials, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 727, 750 (1991); George Fisher, The Jury’s
Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 705 (1997); Valerie P. Hans, Science in the
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more dismal picture of the jury, especially its interaction with science
and mathematics. Case studies of juror performance in complex cases
suggest that jurors have difficulty in comprehending and properly
using scientific evidence.293 Jurors are particularly challenged when
evaluating science based on statistical data.294
Even more
troublesome is what some scholars call the ‘‘gatekeeper effect,’’ where
jurors imbue low-quality expert testimony with undeserved credibility
simply because they think judges inspect evidence themselves before
its admission.295
Jurors also have trouble identifying serious flaws in experimental
setup and how these flaws affect the internal validity of the results.296
The only major flaw that jurors are able to consistently detect is a
missing control group;297 jurors are not very capable of identifying
other confounding variables that have the potential to compromise an
experiment’s results.298 For example, jurors have distinct trouble
identifying an experimenter’s bias.299 Nevertheless, it may not
completely be the jurors’ fault; at the very least, they are not alone, as
some judges have similar difficulties.

2.

Judge Problems

Studies suggest that judges are not much better than jurors at
assessing scientific evidence. Even though their self-confidence may

Jury Box: Jurors’ Comprehension of Mitochondrial DNA Evidence, 35 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 60 (2011).
293. See N.J. Schweitzer & Michael J. Saks, Jurors and Scientific Causation: What
Don’t They Know, and What Can Be Done About It?, 52 JURIMETRICS 433, 434
(2012) (citing Cecil et al., supra note 292, at 752---56) (providing case studies of juror
performance in complex cases).
294. See, e.g., Hans, supra note 292, at 61; Suzanne O. Kaasa et al., Statistical
Inference and Forensic Evidence: Evaluating a Bullet Lead Match, 31 L. & HUMAN
BEHAV. 433, 433 (2006); Joseph Sanders, The Merits of the Paternalistic Justification
for Restrictions on the Admissibility of Expert Evidence, 33 SETON HALL L. REV.
881, 907 (2003); Schweitzer & Saks, supra note 293, at 434 (citing Ulrich Hoffrage et
al., Communicating Statistical Information, 290 SCI. 2261, 2261 (2000)).
295. See N.J. Schweitzer & Michael J. Saks, The Gatekeeper Effect: The Impact of
Judges’ Admissibility Decisions on the Persuasiveness of Expert Testimony, 15
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 1, 1 (2009) (asserting that judges inadvertently endorse the
credibility of poor quality evidence by letting it into suits).
296. See Bradley D. McAuliff & Tejah D. Duckworth, I Spy With My Little Eye:
Jurors’ Detection of Internal Validity Threats in Expert Evidence, 34 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 489 (2010).
297. See id. at 497.
298. See id.
299. See id.

2013]

ADMISSIBILITY OF fMRI TECHNOLOGY

755

overestimate their actual ability,300 judges are human, after all, and are
thus subject to many, if not all, of the same cognitive shortcomings.301
In the same vein, judges are also prone to misunderstanding statistical
information.302 After surveying four hundred state court judges, some
scholars went so far as to say that judges ‘‘lack the scientific literacy
required for a Daubert analysis.’’303 The same study even suggests
that only about five percent of those judges could demonstrate a clear
understanding of falsifiability or error rates.304 Judges, like jurors,
also ‘‘have difficulty identifying methodologically flawed expert
testimony.’’ 305 Judges may err on the side of caution when applying a
Daubert analysis, with some empirical research suggesting that judges
are more likely to exclude evidence the more quantitatively complex
it is.306

300. See Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law,
155 U. PA. L. REV. 165, 190---91 (2006) (extrapolating this conclusion from
comparisons between actuarial and clinical predictions of future dangerousness).
301. See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind: Heuristics and Biases, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 777, 821 (2001) (showing that judges were influenced by cognitive
heuristics such as anchoring, framing effects, hindsight bias, representativeness, and
egocentric biases); Barbara A. Spellman, On the Supposed Expertise of Judges in
Evaluating Evidence, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4---6 (2007).
302. See Neil Vidmar & Shari S. Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK.
L. REV. 1121, 1170 (2001) (citing THE EVOLVING ROLE OF STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS
AS EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS (Stephen E. Fienberg ed., 1989)).
303. See McAuliff & Duckworth, supra note 296, at 489 (citing Sophia Gatowski et
al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges on Judging Expert
Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 433 (2001)).
304. See Gatowski et al., supra note 303, at 452; see also Kittay, supra note 35, at
1397. ‘‘It is difficult to grasp how a proper Daubert inquiry can take place when 96%
of state judges do not understand th[ese] benchmark criteri[a].’’ Id. at 1391. The
Daubert court referred to falsifiability as a ‘‘key question.’’ Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).
305. See McAuliff & Duckworth, supra note 296, at 489 (citing Margaret B.
Kovera & Bradley D. McAuliff, The Effects of Peer Review and Evidence Quality on
Judge Evaluations of Psychological Science: Are Judges Effective Gatekeepers?, 85
J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 574 (2000)).
306. See Mara L. Merlino et al., Judicial Gatekeeping and the Social Construction
of the Admissibility of Expert Testimony, 26 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 200---02 (2008)
(suggesting that some judges refuse to admit evidence simply because they have
difficulty grasping its qualitative complexity). An alternative explanation that has
been suggested is that judges assess scientific evidence with a sufficiency standard
instead of a lower admissibility bar to evidence. See Michael D. Green & Joseph
Sanders, Admissibility Versus Sufficiency: Controlling the Quality of Expert Witness
Testimony in the United States (Wake Forest Univ. Legal Studies Paper No.
2016468; Univ. of Hous. Law Ctr. Paper No. 2016468, 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2016468.
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No Problem: Jurors Are on the Same Page as Judges

Ultimately, even though juries may get more verdicts objectively
wrong than society would be comfortable with,307 jurors generally
perform consistently well when assessed with external criteria of
performance.308 One scholar suggests that juror competence should
not be assessed on an absolute scale (that is, as compared to factual
truth) or even to that of expert witnesses; competence is more
properly assessed across different kinds of evidence, or compared to
the competence of judges.309 Failure to completely comprehend trial
evidence, even scientific or technical in nature, does not produce a
significant departure from the assessments of judges in the same
cases.310 Even though deficiencies in understanding evidence are
undesirable, they ultimately do not have a significant effect on
verdicts.311
Often, attorneys and judges exacerbate the problem and confuse
juries further with their explanations and jury instructions,
respectively.312 Contrary to the popular notion of jurors, the less they
understand about expert testimony, the less likely they are to be
influenced by it.313 In fact, one study shows that judges are more
307. See Cooper Ellenberg, Lie Detection: A Changing of the Guard in the Quest
for Truth in Court?, 33 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 139, 146 (2009) (citing Bruce D. Spencer,
Estimating the Accuracy of Jury Verdicts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 305, 307
(2007)) (asserting that juries returned an objectively incorrect verdict one out of eight
or nine times in a case study of 3500 trials from the 1950s).
308. See Neil Vidmar, Expert Evidence, the Adversary System, and the Jury, 95
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH (SUPP. 1) S137 (2005).
309. See Cecil et al., supra note 292, at 764.
310. See Ellenberg, supra note 307, at 146 n.93 (citing Spencer, supra note 307, at
307) (showing that judges agreed with juries in eighty percent of cases in a study on
the accuracy of jury verdicts, as measured by judge-jury agreement even when the
‘‘correct’’ verdict is unknown); Hans, supra note 292, at 61 (‘‘[W]hatever problems
jurors have with comprehending trial evidence are not severe enough to produce
outcomes that are distinctly different from the assessments of professionally trained
judges across a range of cases.’’).
311. See Cecil et al., supra note 292, at 764.
312. Hans, supra note 292, at 61 (citing Richard O. Lempert, Civil Juries and
Complex Cases: Taking Stock After Twelve Years, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL
JURY SYSTEM 181 (R. Litan ed., 1993)); Eugene Morgulis, Juror Reactions to
Scientific Testimony: Unique Challenges in Complex Mass Torts, 15 B.U. J. SCI. &
TECH. L. 252, 265 (2009) (asserting that since most lawyers cannot fully grasp the
scientific concepts themselves, they ‘‘focus on hurting experts’ credibility, muddling
the scientific issues and making it more difficult for the jury to evaluate the
evidence’’).
313. See Shari S. Diamond, Beyond Fantasy and Nightmare: A Portrait of the Jury,
54 BUFF. L. REV. 717, 747 (2006) (‘‘When the expert’s lack of clarity prevents jurors
from understanding the testimony, jurors who do not understand it are less likely to
be influenced by it.’’).

2013]

ADMISSIBILITY OF fMRI TECHNOLOGY

757

likely than jurors to defer to expert testimony, and are also more
likely than jurors to convict defendants when given the same scientific
evidence.314 The notion that jurors do not comprehend expert
testimony well, or blindly defer to experts, is inconsistent with a
substantial body of empirical research on the subject.315

4.

Paternalism

Given that jurors are sufficiently capable of understanding expert
testimony, excluding such testimony on the grounds that the
confusion it would engender substantially outweighs the probative
value of fMRI is too paternalistic to justify its exclusion.316 In
Scheffer, two Supreme Court Justices, Justices Stevens and Kennedy,
even spoke out in defense of the average juror.317 Excluding reliably
probative evidence using evidentiary rules to ‘‘protect the ignorant
jury’’ is becoming a relic of the past.318
The apparent concern that jurors lose all sense of reality and simply
believe anything and everything they see depicted on a television or
computer screen presupposes a certain naiveté and basic lack of
intelligence on the part of juries that is not only unwarranted as a
matter of psychological research, but is also offensive and even
elitist. 319

Evidence suggests that the best way to reduce jury confusion is to
improve the clarity of both attorneys’ and experts’ explanations.320

314. See Valerie P. Hans, Judges, Juries, and Scientific Evidence, 16 J.L. & POL’Y
19, 43 & n.69 (2007) (comparing judge and juror responses after a mock trial
conducted using mitochondrial DNA evidence).
315. See Vidmar, supra note 308, at S142; see also Vidmar & Diamond, supra note
304, at 1166---67.
316. See generally Sanders, supra note 294.
317. See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 318---19 (1998) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part) (concluding that the argument that the jury will be unable to
properly weigh lie detector evidence ‘‘demeans and mistakes the role and
competence of jurors in deciding the factual question of guilt or innocence’’); id. at
337 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (‘‘[T]he reliance on a fear that the average jury is not able
to assess the weight of this testimony reflects a distressing lack of confidence in the
intelligence of the average American.’’).
318. Jeffrey Bellin, The Significance (if Any) for the Federal Criminal Justice
System of Advances in Lie Detector Technology, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 711, 722 (2007)
(quoting Lee v. Martinez, 96 P.3d 291, 297 (N.M. 2004)) (asserting that evidentiary
exclusion for the purposes of ‘‘protect[ing] the jury from its perceived ignorance is a
relic of a receding era.’’).
319. Galves, supra note 123, at 217---18 (footnotes omitted).
320. See supra note 312 and accompanying text.
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The Great Legal Engine: Cross-Examination

Much of the clarity, or obfuscation, comes from the ‘‘greatest legal
engine ever invented for the discovery of truth,’’ cross-examination.321
There, attorneys attempt to expose inconsistencies, emphasize
deficiencies in arguments, and reduce the effectiveness of lying.322
Indeed, the Daubert Court itself emphasized the importance of crossexamination in this context.323
Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and
careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and
appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence . . . .
These conventional devices, rather than wholesale exclusion . . . are
the appropriate safeguards where the basis of scientific testimony
meets the standards of Rule 702.324

The drafters of FRE 702 were wary of overzealous trial court
judges, warning that their ‘‘role as gatekeeper is not intended to serve
as a replacement for the adversary system.’’325 Several other variables
diminish the over-reaching effect of expert witness testimony in the
courtroom,326 including the ‘‘hired gun’’ effect327: the more biased an
expert is in his testimony, the more likely a juror will substantially or
completely discount it.328
Cross-examination would be important in the early days of fMRI’s
admissibility in order to temper its effect. First, expert testimony
would need to be introduced to explain the nature of the fMRI, the
criteria used for scoring, and the background assumptions.329 Then,

321. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (quoting 5 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 1367 (3d ed. 1940). But see Schauer, supra note 74, at 1195 (citing Jules
Epstein, The Great Engine that Couldn’t: Science, Mistaken Identifications, and the
Limits of Cross-Examination, 36 STETSON L. REV. 727, 774---82 (2007)) (asserting that
cross-examination is not as effective as television writers and viewers believe).
322. Schauer, supra note 74, at 1194.
323. Bellin, supra note 318, at 721.
324. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993).
325. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (amended 2000).
326. Emily L. Foster, Anchoring and the Expert Witness Testimony: Do
Countervailing Forces Offset Anchoring Effects of Expert Witness Testimony?, 77
TENN L. REV. 623, 625 (2010); Lieberman et al., supra note 286, at 52; cf. Lora M.
Levett & Margaret B. Kovera, The Effectiveness of Opposing Expert Witnesses for
Educating Jurors About Unreliable Expert Evidence, 32 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 363, 363
(2008) (asserting that competing expert witnesses caused a general skepticism toward
all the evidence, regardless of its objective quality, instead of sensitizing mock jurors
to methodological deficiencies in the evidence).
327. Schauer & Spellman, supra note 5, at 23 & n.82.
328. Id.
329. Keckler, supra note 1, at 538.
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cross-examination or rival expert testimony would need to focus on
potential issues such as the error rate, possible contamination, invalid
assumptions, etc.330 This process would help expose the shortcomings
of fMRI technology and educate the jurors at the same time.331 The
benefits of this process have already been highlighted within the
context of fMRI imaging: researchers who claimed to have found a
disproportionate effect of fMRI images conceded that informing test
subjects of the technology’s limitations practically eliminated its
effect.332 If, or when, the technology becomes reliable enough to
satisfy FRE 702, the solution is not wholesale exclusion, but to allow
the judicial system to properly run its course with the expectation that
jurors ultimately decide its evidentiary value for themselves. The
confusion created and perpetuated by attorneys, expert witnesses,
and judges cannot be grounds for exclusion of sufficiently probative
evidence.
D. Misleading the Jury: The Jurors Are Already Misled
Another factor against which the probative value of fMRI
deception detection must be weighed is its potential to mislead the
jury.333 Much like its potential for unfair prejudice, critics worry that
jurors will abandon their own abilities and solely rely on evidence
fMRI can provide. Determining the weight and credibility of
testimony is thought to be the ‘‘province of the jury,’’ composed of
jurors ‘‘presumed to be fitted for it by their natural intelligence and
their practical knowledge of men and the ways of men.’’334 Jurors may
not, however, be properly endowed with the natural intelligence
necessary for such a task: jurors have been shown to consistently

330. Id. at 538. See supra Part III.A for a discussion on various methodological
problems that could be raised on cross-examination. On the absurdity of the
assertion that fMRI technology cannot be cross-examined, see Galves, supra note
123, at 225 (stating that the objection that images cannot be cross-examined like a
live witness should be overruled every time it is raised).
331. Cheryl Boudreau & Mathew D. McCubbins, Competition in the Courtroom:
When Does Expert Testimony Improve Jurors’ Decisions?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 793, 815 (2009) (‘‘[The] back and forth that occurs between witnesses and
lawyers during trials . . . [is] beneficial not only because [it] close[s] the sophistication
gap, but also because of the way this closing of the sophistication gap occurs.’’).
332. McCabe et al, supra note 183, at 575. ‘‘Questioning the validity of the fMRI
evidence reduced the proportion of guilty verdicts rendered to the level of the control
condition that was not presented with any evidence of lying.’’ Id. at 574. But see
Michael et al., supra note 227.
333. FED R. EVID. 403.
334. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 313 (1998) (plurality opinion) (citing
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 140 U.S. 76, 88 (1891)).
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make poor credibility assessments based on both behavioral cues and
contextual information.335 As such, fMRI technology can assist jurors
in making credibility assessments without replacing their role as
ultimate arbiters of credibility judgment, as shown in the following
sections.

1.

Credibility Assessment

Research generally shows that humans are very poor at making
credibility assessments, and detecting lies or liars.336 Even though
humans are good at lying, we have serious difficulty discerning lies in
others.337 An average person’s ability to detect deception in a face-toface interaction with another individual is only slightly better than
chance.338 Despite intuitively having more interaction with deception,
even those in law enforcement perform only slightly better than
average people in the same tasks.339 Not only are humans bad at
detecting deception, we have a false sense of confidence in our
abilities, leading us to believe that we are better than we actually
are.340 Generally, humans use ‘‘the demeanor of witnesses, their past
record of truth telling, the internal coherence of their stories, and the
external coherence of their stories with the stories of others’’ to assess
witness credibility.341

a.

Credibility Assessment Using Demeanor

Social science indicates that laypeople poorly assess credibility
when relying on behavioral cues, such as ‘‘facial expressions, tone of

335. See infra Part III.D.1 for a discussion on jurors’ poor credibility assessment.
336. Seaman, supra note 3, at 435 n.36.
337. Langleben & Moriarty, supra note 8, at 223 (citing ALDERT VRIJ, DETECTING
LIES AND DECEIT: PITFALLS AND OPPORTUNITIES (2d ed. 2008)).
338. Id. at 2 (citing Paul Ekman & Maureen O’Sullivan, Who Can Catch A Liar?,
46 AM. PSYCHOL. 913 (1991)); Schauer, supra note 74, at 1213 n.114 (citing various
studies that place the ceiling of the ability of untrained people to determine truth
telling in others around sixty percent).
339. Keckler, supra note 1, at 514 n.18 (citing Christian A. Meissner & Saul M.
Kassin, ‘‘He’s Guilty!’’: Investigator Bias in Judgments of Truth and Deception, 26 L.
& HUM. BEHAV. 469, 472 (2002) (showing in a review of studies no effect of training,
except increased likelihood of labeling all individuals as deceitful, yielding more Type
II errors, along with increased false confidence in one’s abilities)).
340. Seaman, supra note 3, at 435 n.36; see also Meixner, supra note 24, at 1465
(asserting that test subjects were ‘‘unable to discern how effectively they determined
credibility based on demeanor evidence’’).
341. Schauer, supra note 74, at 1195 (citing James P. Timony, Demeanor
Credibility, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 903, 907---13 (2000)).
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voice, aversion of gaze, and general nervousness.’’342 Instead, people
are better able to detect deception when they can discern body
language that subconsciously ‘‘leaks’’ information, which a liar would
prefer to keep hidden.343 People assess the veracity of statements
based on emotional cues at near chance accuracy.344 In one
experiment, an attempt to train test subjects with a method that
assists in discerning verbal and nonverbal cues to detect deception
resulted in even lower accuracy and, despite that reduced accuracy,
higher confidence than those not trained in the accuracy of their
judgments.345 A meta-analysis of the most current research, which
included results from over 24,000 people, found a fifty-four percent
accuracy rate in assessing deception judgments.346

b.

Credibility Assessment Using Context

Research also indicates that laypeople poorly assess credibility
when relying on the ‘‘context, consistency, and depth of witnesses’
statements.’’347 Allowing people to take personal biases and context
into consideration marginally improves lie detection accuracy, but
only in certain situations.348 Even allowing jurors to cross-check

342. Meixner, supra note 24, at 1452, 1463; Max Minzner, Detecting Lies Using
Demeanor, Bias, and Context, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2557, 2565 (2008) (citing Bella
M. DePaulo et al., Cues to Deception, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 74 (2003)) (‘‘[F]ew
reliable cues to deception exist and in particular, the cues widely believed by the
public to signify deception generally do not.’’).
343. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe of the Hands, a Lick of the Lips: The Validity
of Demeanor Evidence in Assessing Witness Credibility, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1157, 1201
(1993).
344. See Paul Ekman & Maureen O’Sullivan, Who Can Catch a Liar?, 46 AM.
PSYCHOL. 913 (1991); see also Olin G. Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV.
1075, 1075 (1991) (‘‘According to the empirical evidence, ordinary people cannot
make effective use of demeanor in deciding whether to believe a witness. On the
contrary, there is some evidence that the observation of demeanor diminishes rather
than enhances the accuracy of credibility judgments.’’). See generally Meixner, supra
note 24 (describing this experiment in more depth).
345. See generally Saul M. Kissin & Christina T. Fong, ‘‘I’m Innocent!’’: Effects of
Training on Judgments of Truth and Deception in the Interrogation Room, 23 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 499 (1999); see also, Meixner, supra note 24, at 1464 n.99 (2012)
(citing Kissin & Fong, supra, at 499).
346. Meixner, supra note 24, at 1466---67 (2012) (citing Charles F. Bond, Jr. & Bella
M. DePaulo, Accuracy of Deception Judgments, 10 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
REV. 214, 216---17, 219 (2006)).
347. Id. at 1468.
348. Max Minzner, Detecting Lies Using Demeanor, Bias, and Context, 29
CARDOZO L. REV. 2557, 2568---78 (2008) (asserting that using contextual cues
improves deception detection when in line with personal biases, while it reduces
deception detection to under-chance accuracy when not in line with said biases).
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stories by asking questions only marginally improved truth or lie
detection accuracy.349 Assuming arguendo that there would be a
marginal improvement if jurors were allowed to ask questions during
trial, the most optimistic juror credibility studies find around sixty
percent accuracy.350
IV. fMRI MAY CHANGE EVERYTHING, BUT FRE 403 C HANGES
NOTHING
This Note proceeds on the very strong assumption that fMRI
deception detection technology will improve to the point of satisfying
Daubert and its accompanying case law. On one hand, jurors do not
attribute more subjective weight than the objective value of fMRI
images, which means that these images do not create unfair prejudice
that outweigh their probative value. On the other hand, jurors
currently overvalue strongly relied upon forensic evidence such as
fingerprints and DNA. Justice Thomas’s plurality opinion in Scheffer
is ultimately non-binding on any court that will pass upon fMRI’s
admissibility.351 Although once thought to be exclusively within the
‘‘province of the jury,’’ empirical evidence shows that jurors are
simply inept at making consistent and accurate credibility
determinations.352 Courts have several options that can dampen the
potential negative impact of its admission, while its admission itself
will serve to perfect the technology and its application.353 Ultimately,
once this technology satisfies Daubert, FRE 403 will not be a bar to
its admissibility.
A. fMRI Images Remain Innocent Until Proven Guilty
FRE 403 will not preclude the admissibility of fMRI deception
detection because its resulting images do not create undue prejudice.
Although of deep previous concern to many scholars,354 new evidence
shows that jurors do not give disproportionate value to fMRI
images;355 as such, they cannot be excluded under FRE 403 for
creating undue prejudice that substantially outweighs its probative
value. The question is not whether the fMRI images create prejudice,
349. Meixner, supra note 24, at 1468---74.
350. Id. at 1473 & n.143 (citing Maria Hartwig et al., Detecting Deception via
Strategic Disclosure of Evidence, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 469, 477 (2005)).
351. See infra Part IV.C; see also United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998).
352. See infra Part IV.D.
353. See infra Parts IV.E, IV.F.
354. See supra notes 213---16 and accompanying text.
355. See supra notes 241---47 and accompanying text.
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as creating prejudice by producing powerful enough evidence to
convince a neutral third party of the persuasiveness of an argument is
the foundation of our adversarial system.356 Rather, it is whether they
are falsely powerful, in that they are more powerful than other types
of visual evidence that the legal system consistently admits,357 and this
disproportionate power is unjustifiable in relation to the evidence’s
reasonable objective value. Some scholars suggest that the admission
of fMRI images would sacrifice procedural justice in favor of
substantive justice.358 However, precluding fMRI images, despite
their having no unique additional influence compared to other visual
images359 or other neuroscientific evidence, that are both already
routinely admissible,360 would sacrifice procedural justice owed to the
images themselves. Despite developing sufficient reliability to satisfy
Daubert, there may still be a problematic gap between its reliability
and its ability: ‘‘[e]ven a test that is accurate enough to meet the
Daubert standard will have serious implications for perceived
systemic legitimacy if it is persuasive enough to yield a conviction
without other strong supporting evidence but is not accurate enough
to ensure that an innocent person is never misdiagnosed.’’361

356. Galves, supra note 123, at 222 (‘‘[C]reating prejudice is exactly what an
advocate is doing when she is advocating for her client or when a witness is testifying
on behalf of one of the litigants------getting the jury to believe her side of the case and
her version of the facts.’’).
357. Schauer, supra note 83 (manuscript at 37---38) (‘‘[The] precise question to be
asked about fMRI evidence therefore, is . . . whether the inflated value they produce
is greater than the inflated value produced by the visual evidence that the legal
system routinely admits.’’).
358. Meixner, supra note 24, at 1462 n.79 (discussing other potential goals of the
justice system besides trial accuracy). ‘‘It is not clear whether this reduction in
procedural justice would be worth the gain in trial accuracy, though one could argue
that modern forensic science has the same problem yet continues to be admitted.’’ Id.
at 1487; see also Sanders, supra note 294, at 940---41.
359. See, e.g., David Gruber & Jacob A. Dickerson, Persuasive Images in Popular
Science: Testing Judgments of Scientific Reasoning and Credibility, 21 PUB.
UNDERSTANDING SCI. 938 (2012) (conducting a study with results showing that there
was no discernible impact between fMRI images and artistic renderings or sciencefiction movie still shots depicting the brain). See generally Jewel, supra note 227
(discussing the advantages of visual advocacy).
360. See supra notes 234---36 and accompanying text (discussing how fMRI images
added no additional impact as compared to neuropsychological testing results); see
also Chloe Boyle, Juror Perception of fMRI Evidence (Sept. 14, 2011) (unpublished
M.S. thesis, California State University, Fullerton) (on file with author) (comparing
juror evaluation of conditions with the variables of fMRI imaging and accompanying
expert testimony in a legal setting).
361. Meixner, supra note 24, at 1487. ‘‘Though truth and legitimacy are certainly
distinct functions of the jury trial, legitimacy is closely tied to the system’s ability (real
or apparent) to discover the truth.’’ Seaman, supra note 3, at 472 n.193. This
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Jurors Overvalue Other Types of Evidence

The gap between the scientific reliability of evidence and the
ability of such evidence to secure a criminal conviction may be
inevitable,362 as jurors often overvalue weak or unreliable types of
evidence, such as eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence, which
are heavily relied upon in securing wrongful convictions.363
Eyewitness testimony has been called the ‘‘single greatest cause of
wrongful convictions’’ in this country.364 Some types of forensic
evidence are routinely admitted despite the fact that they might not
satisfy Daubert if their admissibility was decided for the first time
today,365 and weak forensic evidence has led to a ‘‘disturbing number
of convictions.’’366 Yet, these weak types of evidence serve important
functions in the law, and so too will fMRI deception detection
technology once it satisfies the Daubert threshold.367
C.

Justice Thomas’s Scheffer Opinion Is Not Binding

Indeed, Justice Thomas’s apprehension toward lie detection
technology and the usurpation of the jury’s role in his Scheffer
opinion applies to all expert testimony routinely admitted in court.368
As aforementioned, other types of evidence lend themselves to
undeserved deference, yet jurors are still regularly, and

sentiment is traceable back to William Blackstone’s well-known maxim, ‘‘it is better
that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent man suffer.’’ 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358.
362. To the author’s knowledge, there is no published research on the reasoning
underlying the gap between evidentiary reliability and overvaluation. It is possible
that it is inevitable given the function of evolution and human cognitive heuristics, for
example, to believe in eyewitness testimony.
363. See supra Part III.B.2.
364. See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
365. See supra note 271 and accompanying text.
366. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
367. Schauer, supra note 74, at 1209 (‘‘[W]eak (and thus potentially flawed)
evidence serves important functions in law. Requiring highly valid scientific
processes to certify evidence as ‘compelling,’ ‘conclusive,’ or even ‘highly reliable’ in
order for that evidence to be usable would dramatically revamp the legal system as
we know it.’’).
368. Bellin, supra note 318, at 721 (asserting that once lie detection technology
becomes reliable enough to pass the Daubert standard, the ‘‘residual danger that the
jury will be misled or confused by a particular lie detector expert is then
indistinguishable from that present with other scientific expert testimony routinely
admitted’’). ‘‘Justice Thomas’s distinction notwithstanding, the problem of deference
to expert opinion is a problem for all expert testimony. There is no reason to believe
that jurors will be less able to assess neuroscience evidence than they are to assess
DNA evidence or any other scientific evidence.’’ Pardo, supra note 23, at 317.
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fundamentally, trusted to assess such evidence for themselves.369
However, even though some scholars emphasize the superiority of
fMRI deception detection’s scientific reliability or validity over either
polygraph technology370 or forensic science371 as a basis for eventual
admissibility, another scholar suggests that the assumption that courts
admit these types of evidence because of their reliability may be
unwarranted.372 These other types of evidence will continue to be
admitted because of their strong tradition of admissibility,373 but that
same tradition should not also serve to keep fMRI deception
detection technology out of the courtroom due simply to its
superficial similarity to the polygraph as a lie detector.374
As far as Justice Thomas’s ‘‘province of the jury’’ concern goes, the
Court’s decision in Scheffer does not preclude the admission of fMRI
lie detection technology. As an opinion joined by only a plurality of
the court, it has no binding precedential effect on future court
decisions.375 The Court upheld the military’s ban on the use of
polygraph technology in court-martial proceedings on the narrow
grounds of the government having a legitimate interest in doing so.376
The oft-quoted phrase of the case, ‘‘[a] fundamental premise of our
criminal trial system is that ‘the jury is the lie detector,’’’ lies within
Justice Thomas’s plurality opinion.377 Indeed, Justice Kennedy
emphasized the court’s narrow holding in his concurring opinion.378

369. Pardo, supra note 23, at 317---18.
370. See Teitcher, supra note 151.
371. See Kittay, supra note 35.
372. See Meixner, supra note 24, at 1480.
373. Id.
374. Id.; cf. Kittay, supra note 35, at 1389---95 (asserting that society’s apprehension
against ‘‘mind-reading’’ devices might serve to make fMRI deception detection
inadmissible).
375. Bellin, supra note 318, at 719; see Michael L. Eber, When the Dissent Creates
the Law: Cross-Cutting Majorities and the Prediction Model of Precedent, 58 EMORY
L.J. 207 (2008) (asserting that majority opinions that combine a plurality and
concurrence in the judgment do not create binding precedential value).
376. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 309 (1998).
377. Id. at 313 (quoting United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 912 (9th Cir.
1973)). Another frequently cited part of the opinion is ‘‘[d]etermining the weight and
credibility of witness testimony, therefore, has long been held to be the ‘part of every
case [that] belongs to the jury, who are presumed to be fitted for it by their natural
intelligence and their practical knowledge of men and the ways of men.’’’ Id. (quoting
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 140 U.S. 76, 88 (1891)). Justice Thomas’s plurality
opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Souter. Id. at
305. For a discussion of the different opinions and resulting conclusions, see Seaman,
supra note 3, at 462 & n.148.
378. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 318 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (concurring in the
judgment on the grounds that the per se military ban on polygraph evidence served a
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Thus, Scheffer does not preclude lie detection technology of sufficient
reliability from being admissible simply on the notion that it would
affect the jury’s assessment of witness credibility.379 The prospect of
this technology reaching sufficient reliability ultimately ‘‘raises
fundamental questions about the role of the jury in our . . . justice
system[], and indeed about the purpose of the jury trial itself.’’380
D. The Jury Needs Whatever Help It Can Get
FRE 403 will not preclude the admissibility of fMRI deception
detection because, instead of misleading the jury, it will provide a
confused jury with much-needed assistance in making more accurate
credibility assessments. Given the great difficulty jurors have with
detecting lies,381 fMRI deception detection technology will assist the
jury’s assessment of witness credibility without displacing its role as
the ultimate arbiter of truth. The average ability to detect deception
based on demeanor is around chance, with the use of contextual
factors only marginally improving the ability to detect lies.382 Once
this technology improves, it will certainly assist in the juror’s
credibility assessment; however, introducing this technology will do
anything but replace the jury.383 The notion of truth exists across a
spectrum,384 and most objectively untrue statements uttered by trial
witnesses are ‘‘mistakes, exaggerations, or distortions rather than
bald-faced intentional lies.’’385 Further, as it stands, this technology

legitimate government interest); see also Bellin, supra note 318, at 719 (framing
Justice Kennedy’s opinion as holding that the ‘‘concern that polygraph evidence
would erode the jury’s role as primary or exclusive lie detector was a valid (i.e., not
arbitrary) basis on which a policy maker could exclude such testimony’’).
379. Seaman, supra note 3, at 433 n.25 (citing 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A
TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON
LAW § 875 (2d ed. 1923)) (quoting Dean Wigmore) (‘‘If there is ever devised a
psychological test for the valuation of witnesses, the law will run to meet it.’’). But see
Kittay, supra note 35, at 1353 (2007) (asserting that courts might bar admission of
fMRI lie detection technology because of ‘‘society’s suspicion and fear of ‘mind
reading’ technologies’’); Meixner, supra note 24, at 1460 (‘‘Thus, even if a liedetection tool achieved 100% accuracy when used in the hands of an expert, it would
likely be precluded from use because it would ‘invade the . . . province of the jury’
and ‘[b]y its very nature . . . diminish the jury’s role in making credibility
determinations.’’’).
380. Seaman, supra note 3, at 434.
381. See supra Part III.D.
382. See supra Part III.D1.a.
383. See Seaman, supra note 3, at 475---78 (outlining the remaining role the jury will
play in our justice system in light of the admission of fMRI lie detection technology).
384. See supra Part I.A.2.
385. Seaman, supra note 3, at 476.
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cannot distinguish between true lies and false memories or assertions
of subjective truth.386 A jury would need to assess other evidence
presented that may override the test results, or prove to be more
probative.387 The jury must also determine the credibility of the
expert himself, assessing ‘‘bias, defects in test methodology, the
reliability of the particular machinery used, or even outright
corruption and deceit.’’388
fMRI deception detection’s probative value will not be
substantially outweighed by its potential to confuse the jury under
FRE 403 because it is not intrinsically more confusing than other
types of evidence, and confusion stemming from evidence may
actually be caused by attorneys and judges. The difficulty jurors have
with scientific evidence is shared by judges, which reminds us of the
famous quote, ‘‘Democracy is the worst form of government, except
for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.’’389
The right to a jury trial, with all of its faults, is a constitutional right
and is here to stay for the foreseeable future.390 Deceptiveness
‘‘should be presented as probabilistic rather than a categorical
conclusion that a given witness is truthful or deceptive.’’391 The
statistical analysis required to produce the fMRI data and images, as
well as this probabilistic conclusion of deceptiveness, may initially
confuse the jury given its difficulty with mathematics.392 Nevertheless,
the solution for this confusion is not for the legal system to
paternalistically exclude any evidence that has the propensity to
confuse, as such paternalism undermines the intelligence of the
average American.393 Rather, attorneys must enhance the clarity of
their explanations.

386. See id. at 476 n.215.
387. Pardo, supra note 23, at 318.
388. Seaman, supra note 3, at 475.
389. Sir Winston Churchill, Address Before House of Commons (Nov. 11, 1947), in
444 THE OFFICIAL REPORT, HOUSE OF COMMONS (5TH SERIES) 203, 206---07, available
at http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1947/nov/11/parliament-bill.
390. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also Stronge, supra note 4, at 113 (noting the
societal importance of the jury system as one that ‘‘enables society at large to be
involved in the determination of guilt, and when mistakes are made, either by
exonerating a guilty defendant or imprisoning an innocent one, society shares in the
responsibility for this mistake’’).
391. Langleben & Moriarty, supra note 8, at 227.
392. See supra notes 293---94 and accompanying text.
393. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 337 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (‘‘[T]he
reliance on a fear that the average jury is not able to assess the weight of this
testimony reflects a distressing lack of confidence in the intelligence of the average
American.’’).
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Additional Suggestions to Lessen Potential Harmful Impacts
of fMRI Deception Detection.

Scholars have presented additional suggestions to lessen any
potential harmful impact that fMRI deception detection technology
may have. Because jurors with more formal education or background
in science and mathematics perform better in assessing scientific
evidence,394 some scholars suggest conferring that benefit by neutrally
training the jury through a short tutorial before the beginning of the
trial.395 As mentioned in the advisory committee notes of FRE 403
itself,396 proper cautionary jury instructions may be fashioned for two
reasons. First, they are created to remind jurors of the technical and
legal limits of this technology,397 so that they do not overvalue or
misapply the evidence produced.398 Second, to avoid the gatekeeper
effect, jurors must understand that they are to assess the reliability
and weight given to the evidence by virtue of the testimony given, and
not the fact that it merely satisfies Daubert.399 Even more drastic
recommendations include appointing special masters selected for
their expertise in the subject matter to serve as expert witnesses,400 or
a moratorium on all non-research uses of fMRI deception detection
until a regulatory agency can assess the research and adopt field-wide
standards.401
F.

The Admission of fMRI Will Only Improve Its Reliability

Ultimately, fMRI deception detection’s reliability will only
improve with its admission; with this increase in reliability,402 the

394. Hans, supra note 292, at 69.
395. Id.; see also Schweitzer & Saks, supra note 293, at 433 (asserting that study
results showed that ‘‘[t]rained jurors were better able to assess the quality of the
research, and these more accurate assessments were reflected in their verdicts’’).
396. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s note.
397. E. Spencer Compton, Not Guilty by Reason of Neuroimaging: The Need for
Cautionary Jury Instructions for Neuroscience Evidence in Criminal Trials, 12 VAND.
J. ENT. & TECH. L. 333, 346---54 (2010).
398. See Reese, supra note 2, at 205.
399. Schweitzer & Saks, supra note 2953, at 13.
400. Id.
401. Greely & Illes, supra note 52, at 413---21.
402. Seaman, supra note 3, at 460 n.134---35 (‘‘Several scholars have observed that
the judicial reaction against credibility expertise, and lie detection evidence in
particular, has been wholly out of proportion to its purported lack of scientific
reliability.’’).
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initial apprehension about fMRI will wane.403 If DNA, as the ‘‘gold
standard’’ of evidence, provides a blueprint for the admissibility of
fMRI deception detection, it might be at least another decade or two
before the developmental gap between the theory and technology
closes enough to reach a level of reliability and validity to be
admissible in the judicial system.404 The challenges presented by the
adversarial process through cross-examination or rival expert
testimony will serve to refine the underlying process and presentation
of this technique, as they did with DNA evidence.405 One scholar
fears that seeking the admission of this technique too quickly might
preclude its admission for the foreseeable future,406 which may mean
it is already too late given the Semrau decision. It is more likely,
however, that rejecting its admissibility will not be held to strict
precedent, and will rather be reconsidered in light of the technique’s
technological advancement.407
CONCLUSION
Once fMRI deception detection technology reaches a level of
reliability sufficient enough to satisfy FRE 702 and Daubert, FRE 403
should not bar its admission. The images that fMRI deception
detection techniques produce are not inherently overly prejudicial,
and do not produce the ill-advised initial fear of a ‘‘Christmas tree
effect.’’408 fMRI images are no more influential than neuroscience
evidence that has already been admissible for decades.409 It would be
hypocritical to disallow fMRI deception detection evidence, yet
routinely allow other types of evidence that are often unreliable, and
403. Pardo, supra note 23, at 312; see, e.g., Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Image of
Truth: Photographic Evidence and the Power of Analogy, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1
(1998).
404. Law, supra note 86, at 57---58 (noting that there was a thirty-five-year gap
between the discovery of the double-helix structure of DNA in 1953 and the first
reported appellate court’s acceptance of a trial court’s admission of DNA-based
evidence in 1988).
405. Keckler, supra note 1, at 538. This technology could also be initially limited to
certain circumstances. Id. (noting that performing fMRI deception detection on a
witness that has already proffered testimony negates any constitutional privacy and
evidentiary hearsay issues).
406. Kittay, supra note 35, at 1396 (‘‘Early rejections might not only stall, but doom
the technology’s admissibility for years to come.’’).
407. Feigenson, supra note 93, at 236 n.7 (asserting that advancing technologies
should and would not be held to strict precedent given the improvements in the
underlying technology).
408. See supra Part III.B.1.f (discussing the non-prejudicial effect of fMRI images).
409. See supra notes 234---36 and accompanying text (discussing how fMRI images
added no additional impact as compared to neuropsychological testing results).
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also often overvalued by the jury given their independent objective
evidentiary value.410 Lie detection evidence is not precluded from
admission as a matter of stare decisis, given that Justice Thomas’s
plurality opinion in Scheffer has no binding precedential effect.411
Considering jurors’ woeful credibility assessment abilities, they need
the assistance that this technology will be able to provide.
Ultimately, this Note raises two issues that pervade discussions in
the larger legal arena. First, this Note addresses what encapsulates
the concept of evidentiary reliability, and how different standards of
reliability may be applied to different types of evidence. Second, this
Note addresses what the role of the jury, and the jury trial as a whole,
is within our justice system. Many of the issues that scholars raise
with regard to fMRI deception detection technology are not unique
to this technique, which ultimately raises the following question: ‘‘Is
expert evidence really different?’’412 As a thought experiment goes, if
(or when) lie detection technology were to reach perfect accuracy,
would there be a role for the jury, or jury trial, whatsoever?413 Would
it even have to reach perfect accuracy, or would it simply have to be
more accurate than the juries themselves? This technology may
implicate issues that will cause problems at first,414 but with the right
protections and safeguards,415 it will ultimately serve, and greatly
benefit, society by delivering greater justice. In our justice system’s
search for objective truth, this technology will certainly only uncover
more of it, which is a foundational purpose of our adversarial justice
system. Precluding its admission would not only be an injustice to
those that this technology could assist, from defendants to jurors, but
it would also be an injustice to justice itself.

410. See supra Part III.B.2.
411. See supra Part IV.C.
412. See generally Schauer & Spellman, supra note 5.
413. In most of the recent experiments testing the overvaluation of fMRI images,
test subjects were not told that the technology had any faults, and yet, the technology
still did not have excessive influence. This may be a problem if, or when, the
technology becomes very accurate. In other words, it would be a problem if the jury
should value the evidence very highly, yet does not. In such a case, advocatory jury
instructions or judgments N.O.V. might be appropriate.
414. This technology could also exacerbate effects of economic inequalities among
defendants. See Adina L. Roskies et. al., supra note 220, at 100. Some argue that it
would be easier for defendants to avoid convictions altogether. See, e.g., Schauer,
supra note 74, at 1203---04 (quoting Michael H. Graham, Burdens of Proof and
Presumptions in Criminal Cases, 45 CRIM. L. BULL. 192 (2009)) (asserting that it
would be easier for defendant to avoid convictions since they only need ‘‘slight’’
evidence to escape the ‘‘beyond all reasonable doubt’’ standard); Teitcher, supra note
151.
415. See generally Shen, supra note 7 and accompanying text.

